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INTRODUCTION 
The Problem. -- The problem of this thesis is to 
analyze the Secretariat functions of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff . 
The Method. -- It has been necessary to attack the 
problem through several preliminary steps: first, to 
determine what is meant by secretariat functions; second, 
to outline the functions of the Organization of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff in order to provide a framework within 
which the J.C.S. secretariat functions may be examined. 
The Sources of Material. -- The relatively small 
amount of published material on the subject of secretariat 
functions has been expanded by personal interviews with 
secretariat personnel of other government agencies. Those 
interviewed include: Mr. Maurice Roche, Administrative 
Secretary of the Secretary of Defense; Mr. W. B. McCool, 
Secretary of the Atomic Energy Commission; Mr. Allen James 
of the Secretariat of the Department of State. These men 
have furnished organization charts, operating procedures 
and copies of speeches which they have collected in their 
personal notebooks. \~ere possible this kind of material 
has been appended. Sources of material for the chapter on 
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the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been 
various Hearings before Congressional Committees. These 
are listed in the bibliography. Because of his close 
association with the Joint Secretariat the author has 
had to check many times to insure that he did not reveal 
classified information. A fact might be known by him 
in his daily \rJork, but it has been necessary to find that 
information in an unclassified source before it could 
be used in this thesis . Though the Congressional Com-
mittee Hearings are voluminous they have proved to be an 
ideal place to find the data in unclassified form which 
the author would otherwise have had to leave out. 
The author had to use some data whose exact 
reference source he has not been permitted to use in this 
thesis. Such data though unclassified is not published. 
In some cases it exists alongside data which is classified . 
The mountainous job of separating and extracting and 
publishing data which students might request is beyond 
budget limits. 
The opinions or assertions contained herein are the 
private ones of the writer and are not to be construed as 
official or reflecting the vieV"IS of the Navy Department, 




THE SECRETARIAT FUNCTIONS 
1 . Wba t is Meant by the Term "Secretariat" • 
The term "secretariat" i'1nds wider and wider use in 
the Federal Government each year, yet there is no ac-
cepted dei'inition of' the word except in the broadest 
terms. It is used to describe a governmental tool in 
which a collection of' administrative !'unctions are 
gathered together under one head, generally called 
secretary or executive secretary. 
A limited executive authority is given to the 
secretary in order that he may relieve top level authori-
ties of' as much o:r the burden of' detail as possible to 
:rree them i'or their primary !'unction of' making decisions. 
Historical precedents. --Historically the idea of' 
a secretariat may be traced back along several lines o:r 
development. The use of' the secretariat by France and 
Britain has undoubtedly influenced the modern u.s. ver-
sion. Americans i'irst encountered it in the League of 
Nations and in other international bodies. The greatest 
influence or other countries upon the American acceptance 
or the secretariat probably came during World War II 
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t hrough Combined Chiefs of Staff to our own Joint Chiefs 
of Staff. The influence of the Combined Chiefs of Staff 
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can be observed even today upon the format of many of the 
papers used. In turn the influence of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff secretariat upon other governmental agencies 
becomes apparent when one interviews the present incum-
bents of governmental secretariats. One discovers they 
either received their early training with the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, or their organization was set up under an in-
dividual who had served with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
General Marshal, Chief of Staff of the Army, during World 
War II and at a later date Secretary of Defense and Secretary 
of State, was an enthusiast for the secretariat idea and 
he took men with him from one department to another and in 
t ur n loaned these men to other agencies.* 
Another historical thread might be traced via the 
route by which the "Staff Studyff has been passed from 
agency to agency. The "Staff Study" has long been used 
* One interesting evidence of this thread of historical 
_ influence is the format used for reports by the Atomic 
Energy Commission. Mr. W. B. McCool, Secretary, Atomic 
Energy Commission, stated the format of the AEC came 
f rom the Joint Chiefs of Staff and in turn their format 
is traceable to a format borrowed from the British during 
\aforld War II. 
by the Army and Navy~ and today it is found that almost 
every modern secretariat performs functions built around 
the preparation and use of the "::ttaff Study'•. 
Finally~ there is the historical development from 
business which has tended to sway the direction of gov-
ernmental procedure. Some of the most recent influences 
of this type have been via the business men who have 
served with study groups like the Hoover Commission. Many 
of today's governmental secretariats trace their extensive 
development to the various recommendations of the Hoover 
Commission. This is particularly true of the secretariat 
in the Department of State. 
S~~-e and com__ple~J..ty:, =cp_e_a_t;~_ t~~- ll.~~d. -- The above 
only suggests the historical background of the secretariat 
function. But history alone cannot explain it. A better 
understanding can be obtained by stating the need which 
caused its creation. It is a tool which has been de-
signed to cope with two problems which plague modern 
government -- tremendous size and complexity. 
A simple operation in which the decision maker does 
all of his own staff work offers few problems~ but when 
his operation expands so that he must add a typist and 
later a staff of assistants~ he is faced with the 
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problem of delegation of work. He organizes his staff~ 
he even delegates authority to make decisions. This 
works for a while~ but as his operation continues to 
grow a need for a method by which he can coordinate the 
many delegated authorities develops. No matter how much 
he delegates work~ the exeeutive must still make certain 
decisions. The executive either creates the "super-
staff"* or he seeks a means by which the load of detail 
may be lifted from his shoulders while leaving in his 
own hands the right of decision.** This last is the 
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ideal of the secretariat. Another ideal of the secretariat 
is to operate so as not to take away from the members of 
the staff their right and opportunity to "get the ear" of 
the decision maker. The"super staff'1 interprets the work 
~Th-is-- ~xpre8sion is taken from the title of the article 
by Lt. Colonel Earl w. Edwards and Th~ma~ A. Kenan; 
"Secretary of the General Staff of Super-Staff? 11 : 
Military Review~ January 1955. 
** Some idea of the load on the modern executive may be 
gained from this typical statistical quotation fur-
nished by the Department of State. "The offices of 
the Secretary and Under Secretary receive each day an 
average of: 110 telephone calls -- from outside the 
Department; 340 telephone calls from inside the Depart-
ment; 60 letters or requests for action; 45 papers for 
information; 35 papers for decision; and 25 requests 
for appointments." from an unpublished instructional 
presentation used by the Secretariat of the State 
Department in 1957. 
of others in ~ts own language for the executive. The 
secretariat provides the guidance by which the staff 
member may condense the thought himself and present it 
direct to the executive. This opportunity to interpret 
the work of others for the decision maker is a position 
of power. Manipulation of the secretariat functions can 
be parlayed into this interpretative function with its 
resultant power. When this happens the secretariat 
ceases to exist and the superstaff takes over. It will 
be one of the purposes of this thesis to examine where 
these pockets of power exist in a secretariat in order 
to suggest that knowledge of their existence is one of 
the means to keep them under control. 
Thus far this discussion has treated the development 
of the secretariat as a means to cope with the problem 
of bigness. There is another reason for establishing 
a secretariat; Complexity. 
In a simple operation when a deeision maker finds 
there is a conflict or ideas between two of his 
assistants he can easily make a choiee# but when the 
problem is complex involving technical details which his 
two assistants are each more capable or understanding 
than he is# the decision maker is likely to say "You 
5 
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two re llows get together and thrash it out." This is the 
simple version or the committee system. But committees 
grow larger; the problems bec ome mor e c~nplex . Sub-
cornmi t tees are e s tablished . Ad hoc committees are 
formed. Frequently each member or a committee is 
backed up by his own starr to assist him in forming a 
position on a complex problem. The meetings become 
more frequent and longer until the committeeman finds 
they are interfering with his operational responsibilities. 
At this point the executive who ordered the committee into 
existence is faced with the problem or either discontinu-
ing the committee or establishing a committee whose mem-
bers have no operational duties. This last may be an 
unsatisfactory solution# if the purpose or the committee 
is to tap the fresh views of men who perform the day-to-
day operations. The answer to the dilemma is to establish 
a secretariat in order to free the committee members or 
the administrative functions; and to perform such duties 
as keeping the record# preparing agendas# writing the 
letters which express the decisions and performing other 
semi-executive duties. 
When it is desired to maintain all the members on 
a fairly equal base# the chairman of the committee merely 
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presides, and the executive functions are performed by a 
secretariat which is responsible to the group as a whole. 
This is usually the case in international bodies. The 
articles of the United Nations Charter which establish 
the office of the Secretary General and the Secretariat 
clearly illustrate this method of assigning administra-
tive duties and limited executive duties to a secretariat 
responsible to the group as a whole.* 
~ 
The British and French find this concept of a 
limited executive authority easier to understand and adopt 
than Americans . The Parliamentary form of government 
with its executive power held by a Prime Minister who is 
responsible to the legislative body is similar to the 
committee system in which a limited executive power is 
delegated to a secretariat by the committee. 
It should not be concluded that the secretariat 
concept is entirely foreign to American government . 
* Chapter 6 of the Annual Review of United Nations 
~ Affairs ~ edited by Clyde Eagleton and Richard Swift 
and published by New York U. Press describes how 
the relatively few articles of the United Nations 
Charter (i.e. Articles 97 through 101) have been in-
terpreted to cover the extensive current operations 
of U.N . Secretariat and of the Secretary General . 
Actually the idea has been developed in a surprising 
number of cases. Almost every Federal commission has 
been established with the top executive authority resid-
ing in a committee whose members are divided equally 
between political parties. A secretary is responsible 
to each committee member and to the committee as a 
corporate body. 
An idea of the extent of the development of the 
secretariat concept in the government or the United 
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States can be gained by a brief survey of the publication~ 
United States Government Organization Manual (1956-57) 
(Revised as of June 1~ each year). This manual provides 
a brief summary of the various organizations and commis-
sions of the Federal Government. Almost all of them list 
a secretary to the executive authority~ and some of the 
commissions like the Federal Trade Commission indicate 
a detailed breakdown of the various assistants to the 
secretary. In some cases the secretariat function is not 
listed as such but is called another name. An example 
of this is the Civil Service Commission which speaks 
of the Executive Assis·tant to the Commission and then 
describes his functions as follows: "Maintain control 
or records or all cases and matters submitted to the 
commission for action: arranges conferences~ hearings~ 
and meetings for the Commission~" ... etc.~. The regu-
latory bodies li~e Securities Exchange Commission, 
Federal Trade Commission, Federal Power Commission, Atomic 
Energy Commission~ Interstate Commerce Commission, 
National Labor Relations Board have secretaries. The 
multilateral international organizations list a secre-
tary or secretary generaLinterdepartmental commissions 
and boards list a secretary. For example~ the National 
Forest Reservation Commission Interdepartmental Committee 
on Scientific Research and Development. In almost all 
cases where the top executive board is a committee or com-
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mission made up or different political parties or repre-
sentatives or different governmental agencies a secretariat 
function has been created to perform executive functions 
for the board. 
2. Secretariat functions. 
So far the discussion bas taken the reader around the 
problems to locate the general area in which secretariats 
* p 508 United States Government Organization Manual 
1956-1957 Federal Register Division~ National Archives~ 
General Services Administration, Washington~ D.C. 
operate. It is now important to examine the functions 
of a typical secretariat. 
Among the various agencies which have a secretariat 
there is no standard list of functions. Those which 
follow were derived from a variety of sources* and have 
been arranged in a logical order. 
a. Keep the executive informed · 
b. Anticipate emerging problems 
c. Assign action and follow-up assignment 
d. Assist the Action officers. 
* a. "The Government Secretariat Function Today": 
Remarks prepared by W. B. McCool~ Secretary to the 
u.s. Atomic Energy Commission. Unpublished. 
b. Remarks of Honorable Maxwell M. Rabb~ Secretary to 
the President's Cabinet --February 14~ 1957 (Un-
published) 
c. Unpublished presentation of the Department of State 
entitled "Good Staff Work in the Department of 
State" 
d. The unclassified and unpublished portions of the 
Charter of the Joint Secretariat~ Joint Chiefs of 
Staff 
e. John Gange~ The Secretariat Function, A Staff Aid 
for Executive Management; Fublic Administration 
Clearing House 1953 
f. "How the Secretariat Aids Executive Action'' Staff 
Report to the Task Foree on Paperwork Management 
of the Commission on Organization of the Executive 
Branch of the Government~ October 15~ 1954 
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g. Personal interviews by F. H. Carde with the following: 
(1) Maurice W. Roche 1 Administrative Secretary to 
the Secretary of Defense 
(2) W. B. McCool~ Secretary 1 Atomic Energy Com-
mission. 
e. Prepare agendas or schedule priority of items 
for executive deeision -- eliminate nonessen-
tial items. 
f . Manage committees 
11 
~· Review staff reports for completeness of staff 
action and readiness for decision 
h. Record executive or committee decision 
~. Im~lement action from decision 
j. Kee? interested groups informed of decision 
or action 
k. Perform administrative services such as estab-
lish mail rooms, message centers, supervise 
security, personnel administration, budget con-
trol, space assignment. 
Kee..R _t~he -~~cutt.ve adequately: infot'!!!_e_.c!. The per-
formance of this function combines a variety of judge-
ments which may be expressed in the following questions: 
Is all the information available? What should be elimi-
nated? What should be included? How can that which is 
included be condensed to a minimum? What is the priority 
of information? When should it be presented? 
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The source of data may include a daily summary of 
mail, or of messages and cables, a summary of reports from 
outlying stations or groups within the staff. It may be 
a newspaper clipping service or a summary of the news. It 
may be a review of items gleaned from the Congressional 
Record. 
The reports may be written or verbal. They may be in-
formal notes, staff discussions or they may be in a par-
ticular format presented each day at a specific time. 
Most of this kind of information is status information. 
It is factual and can be summarized; furthermore, it is 
non-controversial. There is another type of information 
which the secretariat sometimes prepares for the executive. 
This is the summary of staff studies recommending action or 
policy. The secretary who finds himself in the position 
of having to condense the papers of others for considera-
tion of his executive may be in a position of considerable 
influence. His personal recommendation influences deci-
sion. Lt. Colonel Edwards and Lt. Colonel Kenan go so far 
as to say, fiAlmost inevitably the secretary and his assis-
tants ultimately find themselves in the positions --
often at the invitation of the chief of staff -- of making 
recommendations to the chief regarding the substance of 
13 
problems and what his actions should be in connection with 
them."* When the secretariat begins to handle this kind of 
information it becomes the superstaff. John Gange states 
• • • 
11well trained secretariat personnel will avoid 
assiduously their becoming a wall around the executive 
through which nothing can pass to him except at their 
pleasure."** 
Because of the opportunities to exert influence this 
function of all the functions of the secretariat is sub-
ject to challenge. There is a natural conflict of in-
terests between a secretariat and the staff of an execu-
tive. The staff member who suspects that his ideas are 
not receiving proper consideration by the executive will 
blame the secretariat. Newspapers 1 Congressmen and pres-
sure groups irate over slowness of a program like mis-
siles or flood control will press for the establishment 
of a czar "who can get in to see the President any time 
he wants 11 • czars do not care to have their messages 
* Lt. Colonel Edwards and Lt. Colonel Thomas A. Kenan~ 
- "Secretary of the General Staff or Super Staff~ 
Military Review January 1955 1 page 2. 
**John Gange~ The Secretariat Function A Staff Aid for 
- -Executive Management; Public -Administration Clearing 
.... House, 1953, page 48. 
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condensed or their time of delivery controlled. Too many 
czars disrupt the normal flow of business. A reorganiza-
tion ensues. Frequently it takes the form of a super-
imposed staff. The existing secretariat finds itself 
further away from the executive unable to guage his needs, 
and its functions are gradually absorbed by the new staff. 
The old secretariat may slowly diminish in its importance, 
but the functions it performs continue under the new staff. 
A secretariat is faced with a dilemma. Ideally it 
should be completely neutral -- uas a non-policy function" . 
But since its functions can be used to promote a particular 
policy it is subject to attack to capture those functions. 
To protect its neutrality in the performance of its func-
tion it is forced to take sides against those who would 
capture the function, and in so doing it modifies its 
position of neutrality. 
Anticipate emerging problem. -- Anticipation of 
emerging problems is sometimes listed as one of the func-
tions of a secretariat. There can be no doubt of its 
need, but it is not a function exclusive to the secretariat. 
Every unit of a healthy organization should include this 
as a task. At the same time the secretariat is frequently 
in a unique position to foretell needs and see problems, 
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because the secretariat has the opportunity to view the 
whole problem facing the erganization. From this vantage 
its members can detect conflicts in policy 1 overlaps and 
gaps in organizational responsibility. 
Some thought should be given concerning how far a 
secretariat should be permitted to go in analyzing an 
answer to the problems which it anticipates. It is fool-
ish to try to separate from one man 1 s brain the function 
of discovering a problem and the function of finding its 
answer. Human minds do not work in restricted or con-
trolled channels. So a secretariat which discovers a 
problem cannot and should not be isolated from a contribu-
tion to its answer. However 1 the secretariat which spends 
more and more time on devising its own answers is taking 
on functions which are likely to lead it away from the 
performance of its primary functions. 
Another danger in the exercise of this function de-
rives when it is combined with the secretariat function 
of assigning action. The secretariat which ean analyze 
the problems to be studied and can control to which parts 
of a staff they are assigned for action is in a position 
to usurp the control of management. 
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Assign action and follow-up the performance of the 
assig11ment -- "Telling people what to do is the job of the 
' ' boss so what right has the secretariat to assign action"? 
An answer to this question should provide a better 
understanding of how our Federal government works and 
what a secretariat does. 
Bigness and complexity -- More and more the executive 
discovers that he cannot personally solve the problems 
which face him. He must seek the advice of his techni-
cians. For a while he tries to read the incoming mail 
and then send the problem to someone on his staff. When 
the technician comes back with the answer he discovers 
he must review the incoming problem again before he lis-
tens to the answer. Twice then he has had to study the 
problem. Why not review both the problem and its answer 
just once. This is after the staff has studied the 
problem. In the end it is the decision which is important. 
conserve the executive~ time for decision making. All 
that is needed is to insure that the incoming mail 
reaches the pertinent staff member. For example: send 
all problems dealing with Taiwan to the expert on Taiwan. 
Send all problems dealing with radar to the expert on 
radar. The mail room can do this. (And it is surprising 
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how many government decisions for the assignment of work 
are made by the anonymous personnel in the mail room.) 
Everything goes beautifully until the problem in-
volves both radar and Taiwan. A decision is needed. It 
need not be made by the top executive but it requires 
more consideration than that which can be given by a 
clerk whose main skill is to maneuver a letter opener 
under the flap of an envelope and clip a routing cover-
sheet on the incoming mail. 
In complicated organizations there is a need for a 
very detailed knowledge of the functions of the many 
parts~ This is a knowledge of personalities, technical 
capabilities and current practices as well as organiza-
tion charts and functional charters. Known workloads 
within the parts of a staff are factors. Determination 
of deadline dates and priority also become important 
factors in the assignment of action. 
An executive soon finds that his problems of assign-
ment of action is too important to be left to a mail 
room but too routine and voluminous to perform himself. 
He soon creates a secretariat and keeps it closely under 
his own control to perform this important function. 
1/ 
Allied to the function of the assignment of action 
is the follow-up of the progress of the solution of a 
problem. This function becomes particularly important 
when problems are assigned to committees. Generally a 
secretariat must be ready to answer the following types 
of questions: 11What problems have been received?" 
-
"vlhen were they received? 11 11Who is working on them? 11 
11How long have they been outstanding and when will they 
be solved?" "Which problems have already been decided? " 
One example of follow-up is indicated in Appendix 11A11 • 
An alert secretariat devises methods to keep the 
executive informed of the answers to these questions. 
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Daily~ monthly., weekly sunnnary reports designed for quick 
consumption~ staff meetings, informal conferences. The 
needs of the executive change and so do the methods of 
informing him. With a goverrnnental system in which ehanges 
in top level executive positions shift with politics or 
where rotation of duty of officers requires frequent 
shifts in policy level personnel it is necessary for 
the secretariat to be alert to fit its methods to the new 
administration. The secretariat which becomes devoted 
to its past practices and reports soon finds it is not 
performing its functions and becomes victim of the 
11 superimposed staff' ' ~ the staff which tells the secre-
tariat how it should assign the action. 
19 
Assist the aetion officers. --This function of 
assisting the action officer is not common to all secre-
tariats. It depends upon whether or not the administrative 
functions have been assigned to the secretariat. An or-
ganization whose executive is the committee or commis-
sion is likelu to assign the administrative functions 
to the secretariat. Such functions include provision 
of message centers, facilities for reproducing reports~ 
library and research assistance, personnel administration~ 
travel arrangements, budget accounting, and similar 
services. 
Prepare agendas or schedule priority of items for 
executive decision. The preparation of an agenda for 
the consideration of a committee or the decision by an 
executive is not simply a matter of shuffling through 
a stack of papers of completed staff work and deciding 
which ones should be considered today. The most im-
portant step starts from the very receipt of the pro-
blem. Should the problem be accepted or not? Is it 
appropriate? Does it belong to this group? Is its 
consideration an efficient use of the time and energy 
of the executive or committee? This decision that a 
problem should be undertaken or rejected is very im-
portant. The time and effort of an executive and 
his supporting organization can be dissipated by non-
essential effort and if the right to reject problems is 
not vigorously exercised an unecrupulous group can 
eompJe tely nullify the efforts of an organization by re-
quests for time-consuming and "red herring 11 types of 
studies. 
Another factor which influences the preparation of 
an agenda is the timing of a problem. A secretariat 
20 
which has too much power in this area can actually in-
fluence a decision by when it sche du les problems for con-
sideration. This is particularly true for committee type 
decisions. By deliberately scheduling the consideration 
of a certain problem when an antagonistic committee member 
is absent or present the secretariat can exert influence 
upon decision. With all this warning it must be empha-
sized that the danger exists in the function itself and 
not in the fact that the function is assigned to the 
secretariat. Such an influence over decision could be 
exerted by any office or group which exercised the 
preparation of the agenda. Appendix B presents a speci-
men of the agenda form used by the PresidentJs Cabinet. 
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Manage committees. --The pros and cons on commit-
tees will be debated for many years, but even those who are 
against them must admit that they will p~ebably continue 
to be the best means of getting people of divergent views 
together. Certainly all international organizations will 
continue to be fundamentally committees. As long as there 
are committees in which the members maintain an equal 
status there will be a need for some agent to carry out 
the administrative and executive functions for the eom-
mittee and still be responsible to the corporate body. 
A secretariat is such an agent. It prepares agendas, 
keeps members informed of meeting dates, maintains the 
record, records decisions, and writes the necessary action 
papers and informs interested persons of the decisions. 
Review staff reports for completeness of staff action 
and readiness for decision. -~ To understand this function 
it is well to consider the ideal toward which the staff 
works in preparing studies for executive decision. vfuen 
a study is forwarded for decision ideally it should be 
presented so that all the executive has to do is say 
11yes" or 11no 11 • In the appendix of this thesis there 
: .' I ; 
is a copy of a paper used by the Department of State 
called "Staff S.tudy Guide 11 (Appendix C) . In the 
illustrated staff study format it shows that all the 
Secretary of State has to do is initial approval or dis-
approval. Another ideal toward which the staffs work 
is to reduce all the essential information to one or pos-
sibly two pages. 
22 
Many large agencies and staffs use one or more 
versions of the staff study format as their tool for staff 
work. Several examples have been appended. They all tend 
to follow these steps: A Staff study (a) states a problem, 
(b) summarizes background information, {c) makes assump-
tions as necessary, (d) discusses the data, (e) arrives 
at a conclusion, (f) recommends action, (g) indicates con-
currences or non-concurrences, (h) includes data for ad-
ministrative handling, (i) appends supporting data in the 
form of tabs and appendices. 
The staff study has been a military tool for planning 
for many years. Its use in the Department of State, The 
Atomic Energy Commission, the President's Cabinet (Appendix 
D) and other government agencies is largely a post World 
War II development. This is undoubtedly due to the 
preferences of Generals Marshal and Eisenhower for this 
method of presenting information. It tends to have one 
weakness. It stereotypes the thinking so that only one 
of the possible solutions is presented to the decisi~n 
maker. When there is a problem which needs an answer 
23 
the decision maker must either select the solution which 
he may not care for or have no decision at all. In 
military planning the "Estimate of the Situation" pre-
sents possible solutions for the decision maker and he 
need not accept that which is recommended by his staff. 
Actually there is nothing in the basic staff study format 
to prevent the staff from presenting several possible 
solutions to a problem except that it does not specifi-
cally require it. As a result too frequently the starr 
presents only one possibility. 
The secretariat does not prepare the staff study. It 
reviews the work f'crir completeness. An example of the 
nature of' their review is indicated by the following 
questions which are used by the State Department. (This 
data is unpublished but is taken from a presentation given 
to personnel who report from overseas for duty in 
Washington.) 
"You can test a good staff' paper against a simple 
check list. 
1. Has the problem been succinctly stated includ-
ing the need f'or the Secretary 1 s attention? 
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2 . Are the needed referenoes present? 
3. Is the discussion short and to the point? 
4. Have the obvious questions been anticipated? 
5. Is the recommended action clear and specific? 
6. Have the concurrences been sought and shown? 
7. Are the tabs and attachments needed? 
8. Is the paper submitted in good time? 
9. Is the format right - is the typing clear? 
Secretariats frequently have an editorial group who 
actually perform this function. They check the references. 
Often they supply additional background data. Of course~ 
they catch errors in spelling and grammar and rhetoric. 
Their most important duty is to insure that the recommenda-
tions can be implemented. For example a recommendation 
to adopt a certain poliey is not sufficient. The new 
policy should be appended along with the forwarding letter 
indicating to whom the policy applies and who should be 
notified of its existence. But this is not all, there 
must be an announcement to cancel any conflicting or 
superseded policies. This kind of editing insures 11com-
pleted staff work". The editors must scrupulously avoid 
indicating their personal views, and in their editing 
they must not change substance. If they feel the substance 
is incorrect they return the paper to the originator for 
his decision of change of substance. 
There needs to be a word on the subject of concur-
rences. Mr. Rabb, Secretary to the President's Cabinet, 
indicates the importance of obtaining the concurrence of 
other interested agencies in this statement made in a 
speech to Jacksonville University, February 14, 1957. 
"consider, for example, the problem of Civil 
Defense planning. Although we have one agency where 
Federal responsibility is focused -- (the Federal 
Civil Defense Administration) -- the job is largely 
one of meshing together the planning being done by 
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a whole group of agencies: the Atomic Energy Conunis-
sion with its data on weapons, the Department of 
Defense, for basic military assumptions, the Department 
of Interior concerning power and fuel resources, the 
Department of Commerce concerning use of roads, and 
its Weather Bureau for information on upper air winds, 
the Labor Department concerning manpower, the Depart-
ment of Health, Education and Welfare concerning medi-
cal supplies -- and yet others for other aspects of 
the total planning job. You can see that unless each 
of those agencies contributes its share, the over-all 
Executive Branch program of Civil Defense planning --
and a vital program it is -- bogs down. This example 
can be repeated over and over. Today'interdepartmental 
teamwork' is no longer a nicety to be admired; it is· 
the indispensable method of doing business in modern 
government . 11 
What Mr. Rabb expressed concerning coordination for 
the cabinet also exists for each agency or department. 
The State Department uses a system of concurrences. The 
AEC publishes a book of policy. The Joint Chiefs of Staff 
* This speech is not published. 
obtain their concurrence by committee agreement. And 
each uses a secretariat as a check to insure that an in-
terested group has not been overlooked for its opinion 
prior to the decision of the executive. 
Record executive and committee decision. -- The 
chief officer of the secretariat is generally present at 
deliberations of the executive body. He records the 
appropriate minutes in order to retain the thought behind 
the decision. Also he records the decision. In spite of 
the desire of a staff to reduce the problem down to a de-
cision of approval or disapproval the decision is fre-
quently not as clear cut as that. Often the approval 
provides for specific changes of words. At other times 
whole thoughts are changed and their exact rewording is 
left to the secretary. Of all the functions of the sec-
retariat this is the most likely to vary from agency to 
agency and from executive to executive. 
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Implement action from decision. -- If the staff work 
has been complete, 'this step consists of writing the memo-
randum or publishing the approved policy, which was attached 
to the original staff study. For the committee or commis-
sion type of executive authority this step is generally 
more specific and detailed than for an agency with an 
operating staff . 
Keep interested groups informed of decisions and 
actions. --So far most of the discussion has dealt with 
the system of keeping the executive informed ana getting 
data and studies prepared for his decision. Every de-
cision in a large organization is not made by the top ex-
ecutive. There is generally a system by which authority 
to make decisions is delegated down the line. The secre-
tariat generally provides a vehicle by which these lower 
level decisions may be brought together for review to 
insure that they are within the known executive policy. 
The Department of Defense uses a system of issuing policy 
called the directives system. It is a ~~~~ i ndexing 
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and filling system so that the man in the field can deter-
mine every directive which has been issued on a subject 
by each echelon of command above him by looking under the 
code number which represents his subject. The secretariat 
of the Atomie Energy Commission issues a policy book. (Sam-
ples of the format are in Appendix E). This book is pre-
pared by the secretariat which expects policy from the 
correspondence and statements or the Commission, the General 
Manager, and Program Directors. These statements are 
worded in succinct f orm approved by the originator and 
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issued in a codified plan. The Department of State Sec-
retariat issues a daily memo in which are recorded the 
actions of the Secretary, the Under Secretary and each 
of the Deputy Undersecretaries. These summarize the con-
ferences and discussions each may have had with foreign 
dignatories . It is both a system by which they may keep 
each other informed and a means for Mr. Dulles to insure 
that his undersecretaries are properly interpreting na-
tional policy. Further it keeps lower level staff person-
nel informed of developments. When the Secretary or Under-
secretary of State is absent these summaries are prepared 
in a special briefing form in order to bring either man 
up to date as to what has transpired in his absence. 
There is one other vehicle used by the State Depart-
ment Secretariat in carrying out its functions of keeping 
interested parties informed. This is the briefing book 
used in preparing members of the staff for visits of 
foreign representatives or for use in attending inter-
national conferences . The Secretariat acts as the edi -
torial board. The members of the staff suggest the topics 
which might be discussed, they cover the background on the 
topic indicating our current policy -- and the foreign 
nations' propable position. This provides the best pos-
sible staff guidance to a representative -- and again 
it can be reviewed by high level executives for accuracy 
of policy interpretation. 
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There is still another aspect in the matter of keeping 
interested groups informed which greatly involves the 
secretariat. This concerns security. There are standard 
classifications of information -- confidential, secret, 
and top secret. But behind the whole principle of security 
is the concept of 11 need to know " mere trustworthiness or 
clearance to receive top secret information does not en-
title an individual to have access to all information. An 
individual should receive only that which he "needs to 
known. A secretariat finds it must have a wide knowledge 
of the requirements of many agencies, groups 1 staffs and 
offices for certain kinds of information. In some cases 
the secretariat must insure that the information is made 
available; for other groups it must be withheld. The 
matter of keeping an organization running smoothly re-
quires that each part receive the information it needs 
in the most expeditious fashion possible. Security re-
quires that they receive no more than is needed. The 
balance between the extreme requires secretariat judgment. 
Perform administrative functions. -- The specific 
tasks required under this ·runctiori have already been 
suggested. The secretariat should strive to create the best 
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atmosphere to produce good staff work by meeting as 
quickly as possible_ the requests for services. The policy 
has been expressed by "Wetre here to pump gas, and if 
you wa·nt we '11 check oil and wipe the windshield u . 
Summary of the Secretariat functions. --The above 
discussion of the functions of a secretariat reveals that 
each secretariat must be fitted to its own organization. 
There is no common list of functions. It would not be pro-
posed that every large organization should separate the 
functions which have been discussed and establish a secre-
tariat. Rather it is desired to indicate that every large 
organization must perform these functions by some part of its 
organization and that some of them are instruments for 
gaining power and should be kept closely under the control 
of top level executive authority to insure that they will 




THE ORGANIZATION OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 
1. Limited Purpose of This Chapter. 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff have never been clearly 
depicted. -- There seems to be no one clear-cut treatise 
which explains the Joint Chiefs of Staff.* It is an or-
~ 
ganization shrouded in mystery of misunderstood secrecy; 
it is a handy whipping boy for newspaper columnists who 
like to build up the possibility of an interservice fight 
or rivalry; it is the organization about which everyone 
on the street has ideas, but few really understand . 
It should be emphasized that this explanation or the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff Organization will not be an exhaustive 
one. The purpose is to present one facet only, the J.C.S. 
as viewed from the Secretariat. 
2. The Political Philosophy Behind the 
Joint Chiefs of Starr. 
Struggle for power. -- It must never be forgotten 
* The bibliography includes a list or magazine articles 
~ which are considered to contain reasonably authentic 
data, but none gives a complete picture, nor do they 
collectively present the kind of picture of the J.C.S. 
needed to understand the Joint Secretariat. 
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that the JCS is involved in the struggle for power. It 
is not meant to imply that any of the personnel of the JCS 
themselves want power, but they are part of the military 
organization and that organization represents power, a 
power which spends as much as $40 Billion per year and 
controls as many as three million men in service. Military 
contracts provide the livlihood of other millions of men. 
A decision on cognizance of missiles is not merely a mili-
tary decision, it is a decision which determines the 
profits and sometimes very existence of private businesses. 
The apparent support for a particular service may be the 
backing of lobbyists and Congressmen and newspapers who 
have personal reasons for their support. 
The military represents power -- and every factor of 
the control of that power has political overtones. There 
are those who would concentrate the power of decision into 
the hands of a few men to insure singleness of purpose 
and responsibility -- to insure efficiency and economy. 
Bitterly opposed are those who fear an autocracy of power, 
and finally there are the compromisers who try to set up 
methods of concentrating the power of decision at the 
same time building into the system checks and balances 
which will prevent an undue wielding of control by any one 
group. 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff; a result of the power 
struggle. --The Joint Chiefs of Staff as an organization 
is a resolution of these basic conflicts. In many ways 
it has great power, but it also has many checks and 
balances. Some of the controls and limitations will show 
up later in this chapter. The important point to note 
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at t h is time is that among those who passed the law which 
established the organization there was a fundamental con-
flict of what degree of power should be given to the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff. 
Who should control the power? -- Closely allied to 
this fundamental problem of how much power t d give the 
chiefs is the questionJ where shoul d the power of final 
decision reside? With Congress?, the President,~ the 
members of his Cabinet, The Secretary of Defense or the 
Secretaries of the various services? The Secretary of 
State, The Bureau of the Budget?, the military chief of 
each service or the Chiefs acting together as a corporate 
body? 
As a matter of fact, each of these stations has 
some influence. Each would like more. The amount and the 
extent of power each wields depends upon the pendulum of 





currently directing the various agencies. 
Civilian control over mil~tary power. -- Basically, 
we believe in civilian control of the military. The men 
who drafted the Constitution wisely and deliberately 
placed many checks and balances over the military. But 
civilian control requires professional advice when military 
problems are involved, and that advice can exert a power-
ful influence wherever it is applied -- with the President, 
Congress or the Secretary of Defense. 
In the Message from the President of the United 
States to the Department of Defense transmitting Reorgani-
zation Plan Number Six, President Eisenhower stated: 
"There must be a clear and unchallenged civilian 
responsibility in the Defense Establishment" ... 
"Conversely, professional military leaders must not 
be thrust into the political arena to become prey 
of partisan politics."* 
His proposal to modify the functioning of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff is covered in the following quotations: 
11 
••• The provision of the Key West agreement, 
under .which the Joint Chiefs of Staff designate 
one of the members as executive agent for each 
unified command, has led to considerable confusion 
and misunderstanding with respect to the relationship 
o£ the Joint Chie£s o£ Sta££ to the Secretary o£ 
* H. Doc 136, 83d Congress, 1st Session. April 30, 1953 
- Message £rom the President o£ the United States trans-
mitting Reorganization Plan No. 6 of 1953, pp 2 and 3 . 
Defense and the relationship of the military chief 
of each service with the civilian secretary of his 
military department 11 • • • • HThe Secretary of De-
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fense shall designate in each case a military depart-
ment to serve as executive agent for a unified com-
mand. 11 ••• uthe channel of responsibility will un-
mistakably .be from the President to the Secretary of 
Defense to the designated civilian secretary of a 
mill tary department . 11* 
.-
These quotations which have just been repeated indicate 
some of the complex methods by which political thinkers 
have maintained civilian control over the military power. 
Which civilians should control the military power? 
vihile the supremacy of civilian authority is generally 
agreed to be essential, there are those who differ as to 
where the civilian power should reside, and this raises 
problems of the relationship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
to their various senior civilian officers. The following 
quotation taken from the testimony of Admiral William 
Leahy, Chief of Staff to President Roosevelt during World 
War II, speaking before a committee of Congress concerning 
Reorganization Plan Number Six: 
" ... when I was asked to come to this committee, 
I went over this as carefully as I could. It was 
a little confusing to me in spots. I brought up to 
the President that he was the Commander in Chief 
by Constitutional provision. This looked as though 
it was being turned over to a Secretary of Defense, 
to some extent or to a large extent. His reply was 
* Ibid. p .3 
'That is just explanatory# and nobody is going to be 
the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces but me.' 
I said, 'Mr. President, if you are going to do it I 
have no criticism at all. It is your job by Consti-
tutional provision; as far as I am concerned you are 
going to do it. ' 11 * 
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Many of these conflicts have been solved by making the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff advisers to the President, and the 
Secretary of Defense, and through the Secretary of De-
-fense to the Secretary of State and the National Security 
council. The -word 11advisers 1' was underlined in the sen-
tence above to emphasize that the Joint Chiefs of Staff do 
not have any command control. And though in latter parts 
of this thesis there will be frequent mention of the de-
cisions of the JCS, it must be emphasized that the decis-
sion is merely to advise the President or the Secretary 
of Defense. Either of those individuals may take or dis-
card the advice of the Joint Chiefs. Final power of 
decision never rests with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
The concentration of power within the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff. --The problem of the degree of power to give to 
* p 209, Reorganization Plan #6; Hearings before the Com-
- mittee on Government Operations., House of Representa-
tives# 83d congress 1st Session. June 17, 18, 19, 20, 
1953-
the Joint Chiefs of Staff or to individual members of 
that staff, particularly the Chairman has been debated. 
Mr. Eberstadt* expresses some of the concern over this 
problem in his testimony before the Committee on Govern-
ment Operations: 
"But I .think in practice, due to his rank and 
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due to his position, which are very important things 
in the military, he (the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff) has practically come between the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff and the President, and I think that is a very 
dangerous thing, particularly dangerous in the present 
state of weapons development and the present state of 
war." . . . 11 I do not want to see much, or I should say, 
complete h~rmony in the Joint Chiefs of Staff. People 
complain because General .Twining says this and General 
vandenberg says t~at. If they did not it would .be 
perilous to our national security. I want everyone of 
those men to speak up and tender whatever contributions 
his arm can make to our national security, and I do not 
want to have one man there who can rap them on the 
knuckles or keep them from expressin~ themselves on 
these matters. That is what I fear. ** 
Another fundamental issue which constantly is being 
debated by the press, and which influences the laws which 
govern the Joint Chiefs of Staff has to do with its basic 
method of organization and operation. 
11There are two well-defined systems of strategic 
* Mr. Ferdinand Eberstadt has been a student on Depart-
ment of Defense organization for many years. In 19~5 
he made a special report for The Secretary of the Navy 
on Unification (reported in Senate Committee on Naval 
Affairs, 79th Congress, October 22, 1945). Again in 194)8 
he headed the Eberstadt task force for the commission on 
Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government. (Hoover Commission) (H. Doc 86, 8lst Gong. 1948). 
**Ibid pp 103,104. 
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planning and military operations. One is the Prussian 
system, involving an all-powerful military Chief of 
Staff, fortified by a general staff which he dominates 
and controls. This system is conducive to, and charac-
terized by, conventional, rigid, and stereotyped mili-
taristic thinking usually built around one military arm, 
one weapon system, and one grand strategic plan be-
lieved to be infallible. It breeds smugness, arro-
gance and overconfidence. It was largely responsible 
for stimulating Germany's embarkation on ventures of 
world conquest in the First World War and in the 
Second 11 • • • 
"The other system, which is our own and the British 
system, the one by which we fought and won the greatest 
and most devastating war of all times, is exemplified 
in our Joint Chiefs of Staff. Under that system the 
three responsible military commanders of the Army, the 
Navy and the Air Force, and I emphasize the words 
1 three responsible military commanders' --subject to 
the Secretary of Defense and the President, constitute 
the highest military strategic planning and operational 
authority. "* 
Other conflicting ideas. --Another conflict concerning 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff has to do with their efficiency 
versus the workload placed upon the military Chiefs. From 
one point of view it appears that we are expecting the 
impossible from a service chief when we ask tha' he spend 
many long hours conferring and being briefed on problems 
of a joint nature as well as devote concentrated attention 
to the directing and planning the operations of his own 
branch of the service~ The proposal is that the Joint 
*Ibid. pp 77,78. 
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Chiefs of Staff should be an organization separate from 
the individual services. They and their staffs should 
not be expected to return to their services and thereby 
should be above partisan thinking. But the opposite view 
is expressed in this way -- again Mr. Eberstadt: 
u ••• what I am after is national security and not 
what is called efficiency. I feel that you would 
sacrifice national security to doctrinaire efficiency 
and a neat chart and that is a dangerous thing to do." .• 
"I do not want a man to make plans that affect my . 
life unless he is responsible for carrying them out. 11* 
This last statement indicates that the Joint Chiefs 
must assume both responsibilities, directing their own 
services, and planning jointly. To do it they must be 
backed up with a type of staff which can conserve their 
time and energy. As suggested in the first chapter --
this is a function of a secretariat, and is the reason 
for the existence of the Joint Secretariat. 
Still another area of conflicting ideas exists in the 
different doctrines of the services. Each service has 
its own fundamental concept of how to fight a war. These 
are developed beyond the simple philosophies of a 
Clausewitz, Mahan or Seversky. They involve new weapons, 
* Ibid. p 101 
collapse of time~ space and even new moral factors in-
volving existence of civilization. 
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Sometimes the differences are harder to understand 
and isolate because thay may involve such simple things 
as semantics. For example~ "What is a limited war? " Or 
the differences may result from different concepts of 
thinking due to the mediums in which they operate~ or 
that some must devote a large part of their manpower to 
logistics~ while others operate from well-stocked bases· ~ 
or carry their logistical requirements along with them 
in the task force. These are factors which influence 
the thinking of the p~anners and make joint understanding 
difficult. 
Also there are differences in the laws. There are so 
many that when they were codified as Title 10 and Title 
32 United States Code~ Public Law 1028, Chapter 1041, 
84th Congress 2d Session, they covered 685 pages. 
By studying those laws it is possible to learn for 
example that the Chief of Naval Operations may order 
fleet units from the Western to the Eastern Mediterranean 
on his own judgment. But the Chief of Staff of the Army 
can only advise the Secretary about troop transfers. It 
was Mr. Brucker~ a civilian~ as Secretary of the Army 1 
who ordered troops to Little Rock, not General Taylor, 
Chief of Staff of the Army. It cannot be concluded 
that the Chief of Naval Operations is a more powerful 
individual than the Chief of Staff of the Army. The im-
portant point is that their authority to act differs in 
many ways. Such differences affect the proceedings of 
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the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The joint plans and the advice 
of the JCS must be tailored to fit many forms. It is not 
merely law -- it is the whole body of thought, custom, and 
tradition which permeates the thinking of the men who serve 
with the different services. And this is why also that such 
differences cannot be immediately corrected by a mere 
change of law . 
Another example of how these ~undamental differences 
show up can be indicated by quoting Admiral Leahy in his 
testimony before a Congressional Committee. 
11I have had several Chiefs of Staff myself in my 
career. They did not have any authority. They are 
advisers to their commanders. If I had ever had a 
Chief of Staff who tried to exercise authority I would 
have fired him then and there. 
11The Army thinks a little dif:t'erently about that. 
The Army seems to think that a Chief of Staff should 
have some authority of some kind that is given him by 
legislative enactment , or some 1~ay, anyway he has it. 11* 
* tbid. p 209 
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It has not been the intention to outline all the 
conflicting points of view which influence the operation 
of the JCS. It is merely desired to indicate in broad 
pattern some of the dissensions in thinking which have 
contributed to the complexity of the JC3 organization 
and which influence its current operations and planning. 
3. The Historical Development of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
Before World War II. -- There is no published history 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Such a history will have 
to wait until enough time has passed that our national 
security does not depend upon holding today's plans secret. 
Our interest in history concerns only the organizational 
changes which reflect on the Joint Secretariat, and fortu-
nately that information is available in the laws or in 
the various hearings before Congressional Committees. 
From 1903 until Pearl Harbor there was an association 
of the Army and Navy known as the 11 Joint Board" . The 
spirit of the association may be expressed by the comment 
of Secretary of War Mr. Garrison to the Secretary of the 
Navy, Mr. Daniels during President Wilson's administration: 
"I don't give a damn for the Navy. You don't give a damn 
for the Army. I'll run my machine; you run yours. "* The 
* Remarks of the Honorable Maxwell M. Rabb, Secretary to the 
~ Cabinet at Jacksonville University, Jacksonville, Florida, 
February 14 , 1957. 
confusion which the various Pearl Harbor investigations 
revealed illustrates the inadequacy of the association. 
Apparently it lacked any formal organization both as to 
membership and supporting staff or secretariat. There 
were no stated times of meetings. More important, few 
problems were referred to it. The Reorganization Plan 
of 1947 was designed to correct any such tendencies to 
separation to grow up again. 
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World War II -- The wartime Chiefs of Staff organi-
zation was far more effective. The major plans for con-
ducting the war were made by the Joint Chiefs. They 
operated in cooperation with their associated organization, 
the Combined Chiefs of Staff which was composed of the top 
military officers of the United States, Britain and some-
times France. There can be little doubt that the British 
concepts in the Combined Chiefs of Staff influenced the 
method of operating in the Joint Chiefs of Staff. That is 
particularly true of the secretariat function. It started 
in the JCS as a method of handling administrative matters 
but soon branched out to recording meetings and imple-
menting decisions as well as assigning problems to com-
mittees, which were selected from nominations made by 
the various services. 
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'jThe Joint Chiefs of Staff organization was es-
tablished -- without charter -- in the early months 
of 1942, to coordinate the military direction of the 
war under the President and to coordinate American 
action with that of the British under the British 
Joint Chiefs of Staff as _a part of the combined 
British-American Chiefs of Staff.* 
During the war the meetings of the Chiefs varied. They 
started as a small group but soon grew to fifty or sixty 
persons. Many of these were experts in the fields of opera-
tions and planning who attended the meetings to assist 
their own chiefs with statistics, data and advice. These 
same extra people made up the committees which were soon 
organized to investigate specific problems. Two things 
in this kind of organization caused difficulty. First, 
meetings of fifty or sixty people were unwieldly. 
Secondly the committees had difficulty performing their 
committee work and carrying out their duties in their 
own service billets. The first problem was solved by 
hav i ng Chief of Starr luncheons every day, in which the 
major problems were discussed within a much smaller 
group. The second problem was alleviated by furnishing 
* Testimony of Admiral Charles M. Cooke, USN before the 
_ Committee on Government Operations page 127 Reorganiza-
tion Plan Number Six of 1953. 
a military secretary to each committee. That individual 
was under the command of the Secretary of the Joint 
Chiefs and performed the job of research and did much 
of the actual report writing. Today's Joint Staff has 
evolved from the functions of committee secretaries. 
Here is Admiral Leahy's description of how the Joint 
Chiefs operated in time of war~ while he was Chief of 
Staff to President Roosevelt. 
1
'The way we worked with President Roosevelt 
was that he would tell us what his gener~l plans 
for the war were~ and he would talk to us about it. 
He would say~ 'That is what I would like to do~ and 
I would like to have you go over it and tell me 
whether you think it will work or not, and whether 
you have any suggestions to make with respect thereto. 1 
11We would take it back to our offices and work 
very hard on that. 
"We finally came to an agreement. All of us 
agreed~ and we went back and told the President we 
thought it was all right. He would accept it. He 
would say~ 'All right; that. is the policy. Now, I 
wish you would go back to your office and do a little 
more work, i f you would like, and tell me the details 
of how you think I ought to do this.' 
11Tha t was a tough job, of course . We wast 
back and gave it a good deal of thought and a good 
deal of study. 
11We had some assistance in those days. It was 
what they call in these talks here, the Joint Staff. 
We did not call them a staff. They were _under the 
supervision or the Secretary of the Jo~t Chiefs of 
Staff, and we called them Committees. 
11 In those days the one I remember best as our 
Secretary was 'Beetle' Smith, who afterwards went with 
Eisenhower as a Chief of Staff in Europe. He handled 
all that. We would tell him to farm out these different 
problems to different people and get a report. He would 
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get the report and bring it to us. That was very 
helpful~ because they were very carefully selected 
young men. They were younger than we were~ but 
they were good . 
11Then we would make a study of how we thought 
it would work if the President would use our sug-
gestion, and we would go o~er and tell him. He would 
always take it~ I would say in every case but a few. 
He might make a little modification of some kind. 
But he was thoroughly interested himself, and he was 
competent in it. 
11Then he would te 11 me who was going to have 
the different connnands. " 
••• 
11They (Chief of Naval Operations and Chief 
of Staff~ Army) . were to keep the Secretaries informed .. 
Then they brought back the news about what was hap-
pening. They were not in command. We did not give 
executive authority to individual members of the staff, 
although it practically amoun·ted to that. But it was 
in the Department which was acting with the approval 
of the President. Everything was done with the approval 
of the President . u * 
Post war. -- After World war II there was an intense 
drive to reorganize the whole defense system. The forces 
behind the drive, and all of the conflicting ideas which 
were aired in endless pages of testimony cannot be covered 
in this part of the discussion. However, it is well to 
review some of the national debate which occurred in the 
period following World War II. The nation waa still 
shocked that prior to World War II a system had existed 
which allowed surprise attack at Pearl Harbor to occur 
that intelligence information if properly interpreted 
might have warned of the attack -- that Army and Navy 
* Ibid page 210 
commanders in Hawaii did not keep each other adequately 
informed. Similarly there were many thinking people 
who questioned the policy whereby so much unrestricted 
power was concentrated into the hands of military men . 
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in time of war. There appeared to be inadequate civilian 
control. There were some people who feared that after 
the next war the military men might not relinquish their 
power. Those people wanted to strengthen the check 
against the 11man on horseback". Other people were con-
vinced that many of the military decisions had been 
wrong because they had not taken enough account of the re-
sultant political difficulties. For example many questioned 
the wisdom of the decision to invade Europe across the 
English Channel believing it would have been better to 
accept the British proposal to strike through the Balkans. 
While this view was not shared by all citizens of the 
United States, there was unanimity in feeling that there 
should be a system which would insure that the political 
factor was considered in making military plans. The re-
sult of all the debate was the passage of the National 
Security Act of 1947. It is important to realize that the 
National Security Act of 1947 which legally and formally 
established a Joint Chiefs of Staff also created a 
Department of Defense~ a National Security Council and 
a third service~ the Air Force. The creation of a third 
service took recognition of an existing force within the 
military establishment. On the other hand the creation 
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of a Department of Defense and a National Security Council 
created two levels of authority above the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff. To some extent the creation of these particular 
agencies was a natural result of a change from war to 
peace. control of the budget became paramount and are-
assertion of civilian predominance over military expendi-
tures was inevitable; the Department of Defense with its 
civilian staff and head took over this function. Also 
with the end of war the diplomatic functions re-emerged~ 
and the Department of State resumed its importance. The 
experience of Pearl Harbor emphasized the importance of a 
national intelligence and the Central Intelligence Agency 
was created. Also from war experience there were created 
offices to handle resources and manpower which were later 
combined under the one agency~ the Office of Defense 
Mobilization. Each of these groups was represented on the 
National Security Council. This was the body created to 
"advise the President ... on matters relating to the 
national security ... 11 There was no military man on this 
council. Its military representative was a civilian~ the 
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Secretary of Defense. This was the body which was set 
up to do many of the functions which Admiral Leahy stated 
as having been performed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
during World War II. 
There were also changes within the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff itself. Its functions were clearly set forth and 
defined. A formal organization was created. Both of 
these set up boundaries where none had been before. Mem-
bers were designated from the Chiefs of each of the 
services.* A joint Staff was formally recognized and 
put under a Director. Various checks were instituted 
such as limiting the number of officers who should serve 
on the Joint Staff, specifying that membership on the 
staff should be equally distributed among the services, 
and controlling the terms of office of the members. 
In 1949 the National Security Act was amended to 
create the office of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
His powers were to preside over meetings and supervise the 
agenda, but he was specifically denied a vote, and it was 
stated he would have no command over military forces. 
* The Commandant of the Marine Corps could cast a vote on 
_ matters pertinent to the Marine Corps. 
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Reorganization Plan No. 6. -- The next major change 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff occurred in 1953 . This modi-
fication was instituted under the authority granted to the 
President under the Reorganization Act of 1949 . That law 
grants the President power to reorganize ,the Executive 
branch of the government as he judges best; such reorgani-
zation to become effective autDmatically unless action is 
taken by either house of Congress to oppose a specific 
proposal within sixty days of submission to them. The 
change which effected the Joint Chiefs of Staff is known as 
Reorganization Plan No. 6, and it strengthened the power 
granted to the Chairman by giving him authority to umanage 
the Joint Staff and its Director". Specifically he gained 
authority over the appointment and tenure of officer of 
the Joint Staff personnel. Also, it granted him authority 
to appoint members of the Joint Staff to work directly 
with personnel of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. 
Another feature of Reorganization Plan No. 6 was the removal 
of direct command authority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
over Unified and Specified Commands. Prior to this 
change the Joint Chiefs of Staff could establish a 
Unified Command and appoint one of their own members as 
the executive agent. The change gave the power of 
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executive agency appointment to the Secretary of Defense 
but stated that he must appoint one of the Services. 
It is interesting to note~ from the point of view of 
this thesis~ that there is no mention in the laws of the 
Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or of the Secretariat. 
However~ the Rockefeller Committee~ whose study was used 
to determine what changes were needed speaks of the "sub-
ordinate structure " separate from the Joint Staff.* 
' It is not intended tha~ this brief review of the 
history of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be complete. 
It is pertinent that it be emphasized that three times 
in less than ten years has Congress investigated and changed 
the powers and organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
The pertinent testimony (listed in the bibliography) makes 
a stack of bound volumes two feet high. It is doubtf.ul 
if any organization made up of such relatively small number 
of people has been comparably under such a spotlight of 
* Source of the data on the history of the Joint Chiefs of 
_ Staff from 1947 until 1956 is the Committee Print~ 84th 
congress 2d Session~ National Security Act of 1947 
(Public Law 253~ 80th Congress July 1947 61 Stat 495~ 
Amended through August 10, 1956. This publication in-
cludes the original act~ its changes, the Rockefeller 
committee Report on Department of Defense Organization 
plus the legal opinion of the c ounsel for the Committee 




3. current Functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
The functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are set 
forth in Section 211 of Public Law 253, 80th Congress . 
They include the following: 
a . To advise : 
11The Joint Chiefs of Staff are the principal 
military advisers to the President, the National 
Security council, and the Secretary of Defense. 1: 
In addition Section 202 authorizes that a member of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff on his own initiative, after 
first informing the Secretary of Defense may make recom-
mendations relating to the Department of Defense to the 
Congress on matters that he may deem proper . 
b . To plan: 
11The Joint Chiefs of Staff shall . . . prepare 
strategic plans and provide for strategic direction of 
the armed forces. 11 
HThey shall 'prepare Joint Logistic Plans and 
assign logistic responsibilities to the armed forces 
in accordance with those plans' . H 
c . To formulate policies for training and education. 
11They shall 'formulate policies for Joint training 
of the ,armed forces' and formulate policies for co-
ordinating 'military education of members of the 
armed forces. ' 11 
d . uTo establish unified commands in strategic areas. r: 
This function must be viewed from the restrictions 
imposed by Reorganization Plan No. 6 which took a\'lay 
from the Joint Chiefs their power to appoint one of 
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their members as an executive agent and gave that power 
to the Secretary of Defense who may designate one of the 
military departments as executive agent. 
e. To 11provide for representation of the United 
States on .the Military Staff Committee of the United 
Nations 11 • 
' f. To 11perform other duties as the President or 
the-Secretary of Defense may prescribe."* 
The Chairman. -- Also relevant to any consideration 
of functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is a listing 
of those exclusive functions of the Chairman and the 
Joint Staff. The laN very definitely states that the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs will not have a vote nor 
will he have command authority over any of the other 
Chiefs or of any of the armed services. In his article 
in U.S . News and World Report of February 25, 1955 en-
titled 11We Give Military Advice Onlyu Admiral Radford, 
at that time Chai~nan of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
* National Security Act of 1947 Title II, Section 211 
~ (Public Law 253, 80th Congress . July 26 1947) (61 
Stat 495) with Amendments through August 1956. 
analyzed his powers as a Chairman and pointed out that 
it could not be denied that when there was a difference 
of opinion the Chairman exerted the equivalent of a vote 
\then he made his report to the Secretary of Defense or 
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the President on 11 those issues upon which the Joint Chiefs 
did not agree.* 
The specific functions assigned to the Chairman are: 
(a) to preside over the Joint Chiefs of Staff; (b) to pro-
vide the agenda for the meetings of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff and assist them in carrying out their business as 
promptly as practicable. (This function is in part per-
formed by the Secretariat and will be discussed in a 
later chapter.); (c) to inform the Secretary of Defense and 
when the President and Secretary of Defense consider it ap-
propriate, The President, of those issues upon which the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff have not agreed.** 
The Joint Staff . The precepts of the National 
Security Act of 1947 for the Joint Staff deal with how 
it must be composed, how its members must be selected, 
*Admiral Arthur W. Radford, fiwe Give Military Advice Only u 
_ (An interview) U.S. News and World Report February 25, 
1955. ' 
** Section 212 National Security Act of 1947 as amended 
through August 10, 1956. 
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and include specific instructions on the selection of the 
Director of the Joint Staff. It is interesting that the 
264 pages of the Hearings of the Committee on Government 
Operations on Reorganization Plan No. 6 dealt almost 
exclusively with two points concerning the Joint Staff 3 
that is 3 whether the Chairman should have power to dismiss 
members of the Joint Staff and whether or not the Director 
of the Joint Staff together with the Joint Staff should ' 
come under the management of the Chairman. The functions 
of the Joint Staff as provided by law are 11 to perform 
such ·duties as the Joint Chiefs of Staff direct. 11* 
The Joint Secretariat. --We have examined the state-
ments of the law concerning the Joint Chiefs of Staff and 
the Joint Staff 3 but for purposes of this thesis we are 
also interested in the Joint Secretariat 3 and it is 
necessary to examine any specific requirements of the 
law which would influence the Secretariat. Actually there 
is no mention of the Secretariat in the National Security 
Act of 1947 or in any of its amendments. The President 
does not mention it in his letter transmitting 
* Ibid 
Reorganization Plan No. 6 to Congress.* It is, however, 
alluded to by r~. Rockefeller, Chairman, Committee on 
Department of Defense Organization in his letter to 
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Mr. Wilson, Secretary of Defense, reporting the results 
of his committee study of Department of Defense Organiza-
tion dated April 11, 1953. ** 11The Director of the Joint 
'. 
Staff under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, should be fully responsible for managing 
all aspects of the Joint Chiefs of Staff subordinate 
structure, including its secretary, secretariat, committees 
and staff groups". There is no mention of the functions 
to be performed. 
There is one other very interesting point about the 
secretariat which is pertinent to a discussion of the 
functions of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff. The law restricts the Joint Staff to 210 officers. 
By interpretation of the General counsel of the Department 
of Defense the Joint Secretariat is not part of the 
Joint Staff and therefore need not be included as part 
* House Document 136, 83d Congress, 1st Session. 
*• p. 44 National Security Act of 1947 Public Law 253, 80th 
- - ·Congress, July 26", 1947 with amendments through August 
1956. Committee Print 84th Congress 2d Session. 
of the 210 officer re s triction.* The key point in t he 
interpretation is that officers of the Joint Secretari a t 
are not assigned to a planning agency. 
5 . The Functional Organization of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
What should be included in the term Organization 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff? -- The organization which 
has evolved from the previously outlined complications 
of political ideas, law, and historical change, is rela-
tively simple. The only difficult part is to determine 
what part of the Department of Defense to leave out when 
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speaking of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Normally the term 
is used to speak of the few officers and men whose offices 
a r e found in the restricted area of the Pentagon along 
the ninth corridor of the second floor. This is satis-
factory for most purposes, but since the Joint Secretariat 
f unction is to assist in the coordination of all parts of 
t he decision making process it is necessary to consider 
all parts of the defense organization which contribute 
t o the J.C.S. decision. This means that personnel whose 
* Memorandum from Marx Leva, General Counsel Department of 
~ Defense to Mr. J.R. Loftis, dated September 9, 1949, 
subject: 110fficer Limitation for the Joint Staff in the 
National Security Act of 1947 as amended." 
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main assignment is with their respective service staffs, 
but who also contribute thought and staff work which be-
comes integrated into the final decisions, must be in-
cluded as part of the functional organization of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff. 
Appendix F is a standard functional chart of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff Organization. Since this chart 
is complicated because of its detail, it is better to 
start with a schematic diagram. 
--
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The schematic organization. -- This chart is a 
schematic description of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Organization, At the point (1) are indicated the Chiefs, 
The Chairman, and the Chiefs of Army, Navy, Air Force 
and r~rines. They are assisted in their decision making 
by the Operations Deputies marked (2). This group fre-
quently smooths out the split opinions of the services 
prior to their consideration by the Chiefs. Both of 
these groups are backed up by pertinent sections of their 
respective service staffs (3). Wherever possible each 
Chief has his own staff of experts on logistics or opera-
tions or plans, review the solution to a problem prior 
to its consideration by the Chiefs meeting as a group, 
to make a final decision. Prior to the time that the 
problem is considered by the Chiefs it is passed on by 
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the committees, indicated by (4). The Committees are 
composed of representatives from each of the services who 
devote only part of their time to J.c.s. committee work. 
The major part of their time is devoted ·to their duties 
with their own services. The full list of committees is 
included on the ehart in Appendix F. Some of the major 
ones include Strategic Plans, Logistics, Intelligence, etc. 
Generally the representatives on such committees are the 
Deputies for the corresponding staff billets in their 
respective services. That is the Logistics Committee 
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will be made up of the senior officers holding the 
Logistics Staff billets in each service. This means that 
the problems at the committee stage receive the considera-
tion of officers who have achieved a two or three star 
rank . 
The groups just described, (1), (2), (3), (4), are 
all part time workers with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and 
are direct representatives of their own services. 
The actual spade work of research and report writing 
is done by the Groups (5). Each committee has its cor-
responding group, i.e. the Strategic Plans Group prepares 
studies for consideration of its corresponding Strategic 
Plans Committee. Also the Deputy Director of the Joint 
Staff for Strategic Plans is simultaneously the Chairman 
of the Strategic Plans Committee. This means that he is 
able to order the work of the group to fit the needs and 
direction of the Committee. The Groups are divided into 
teams composed of one member each of Army, Navy, and 
Air Force with the Marines sitting in for the Navy member 
where the subject matter is more pertinent to their 
interests. The Teams become expert in their particular 
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fields of interest. For instance there are teams for 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization matters; teams for 
personnel planning, specialists in intelligence regarding 
particular geographic areas. A sample of the breakdown 
of the Joint Strategic Plans Group into teams is included 
as Appendix 6. It is most important to emphasize that 
the division of teams into members from each of the three 
services is for the purpose of bringing together a wide 
experience and that while serving with the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff the members of Committees and Groups, and Teams 
are expected to maintain a non-partisan service point 
of view. 
The Joint Staff. --All the groups taken together 
make up the Joint Staff indicated by the box enclosed 
by dashed lines and labeled (6). The Joint Staff is 
supervised by the Director and comes under the management 
control of the Chairman. 
The Secretariat. --The Secretariat is not shown on 
this chart. Its relationship to the several parts will be 
described in the next chapter. However, it can be stated 
that there is a secretary performing secretarial functions 
with each of the committees; also there are secretaries 
on the immediate staff of each of the Service Chiefs, plus 
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a central coordinating group called the Joint Secretariat 
(Appendix J) . 
In addition to the groups shown on this schematic 
diagram are spec ial groups and agencies such as the u.s. 
Delegation to the Military Staff committee of the United 
Nations 3 U.S. Representative to the Standing Group of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the U.S. Delegation 
to the Inter-American Defense Board. 
Unified Commands. Another section which must oc-
casionally be included as part of the decision making 
process of the Joint Chiefs of Staff includes the various 
Unified 3 Specified and Joint Commands such as the 
Strategic Air command 3 The Continental Air Defense com-
mand, Commander in Chief of the Pacific. 
Joint Schools. -- Also as part of the over-all 
organization, but not shown on any of the charts are the 
Joint Staff Colleges, Armed Forces Staff College, the 
Industrial College of the Armed Forces, and the National 
War College. 
The Charters. --Each of the groups and agencies 
associated with the Joint Chiefs of Staff has been granted 
a charter by the Joint Chief'~ .. These Charters are 
generally secret, but since an unclassified version is 
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available (but unpublished) it will serve to give a 
satisfactory idea of the nature of such charters. Appended 
are the Charters for the Joint Strategic Plans Committee 
(Appendix H) and its corresponding Joint Strategic Plans 
Group (Appendix I) 
The detailed delegation of responsibilities by the 
Joint Chiefs in the form of charters has made it possible 
for the Joint Secretariat to take over the function of 
assigning problems. Practically all issues receive by 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff automatically belong within the 
areas of the Charters as predetermined by the Chiefs. 
The step by step progress of a problem. -- Another 
approach to an ·understanding of the Organization of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff is to follow the processing of a 
problem through the various agencies and parts of the 
J.C.S. Organization. This process will be covered in more 
detail in the next chapter, but enough will be indicated 
here to bring the relati-onship of the various parts into 
focus. 
The origin of the problem. -- The first step is the 
origin of the problem followed by its acceptance or re-
jection. Some problems such as the preparation of the 
annual plans are continuing functions and have been deter-
mined by the chiefs themselves as the proper way to 
carry out the planning responsibility assigned by law. 
Other problems come from outside sources. The. State 
Department, or the National Security Council, or one of 
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the many departments asks for advice or an opinion from 
the Chiefs. Most of these requests for opinion are 
channeled through the Secretary of Defense to the Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Obviously some of these re-
quests must be rejected as inappropriate for consideration 
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is the function of the 
Chairman, under his authority over the agenda, to reject 
a request when he considers the matter is not one perti-
nent to the responsibilities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
The Director of the Joint Staff, and the Secretary may 
each advise in this function. In addition, in accordance 
with the process outlined by the President in transmitting 
Reorganization Plan No. 6 of 1953, the "Joint Staff and 
subcommittees of the: Joint Chiefs of Staff 11 • • • 11arrange 
for the fullest cooperation 11 • • • "with other parts of 
' the Office of the Secretary of Defense in the early stages 
of staff work on any major problem."* 
* House Document 136, 83d Congress, 1st Session, April 30 
~ 1953, p 6. 
66 
This last procedure means that many of the external 
problems are weeded out by informal study before they are 
formally submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The 
other main source for the origin of problems is internal. 
Each of the Chiefs may, and frequently does, submit a 
problem for consideration. Also the various committees 
and groups originate problems. From time to time the 
Secretariat has submitted issues. This is in keeping 
with the Secretariat function mentioned in the first 
chapter to "Anticipate Emerging Problems." 
The assignment of the problem for study. -- The 
second step is t he assignment of the . problem to the ap-
propriate committee. This is a function of the Secre-
tariat. But as stated before it is not an arbitrary 
decision. The Charters described in the previous section 
provide the pattern. The committees in turn assign the 
problems to the appropriate team of their corresponding 
group. Actually this is done by the Deputy Director in 
in his two-hat function as chairman of the committee 
and deputy director of a group. 
The committee solution. -- The solution to the problem 
is first prepared by the team of the Joint Staff Group 
and then is submitted to the committees for their pre-
liminary consideration. 
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The committees, which it must be remembered are only 
part time members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and who 
are operating members of their own Service staffs, review 
the solution. ~1ey determine if the study will be ac-
ceptable to their o~m services, but they must never for-
get 11 it is their duty to reach decisions 1tlhich will best 
' 
serve the interests of national security. 11 * 
, -
The service shall review. -- The next step is the 
individual review by the Chiefs and their service staffs. 
In preparation for this step the work of the co~mittees is 
turned over to the Joint Secretariat where it is edited, 
published and distributed. Speed is a prime consideration 
for the Joint Secretariat's task, in order to get the paper 
to the service staffs in time to allow them the maximum 
time for study and for preparation of the briefing of 
their own chief prior to the time he must vote on the 
problem in a Joint session. This is a most important 
part of the decision process. The Chiefs are called upon 
to pass judgment on a wide variety of subjects. They must 
* This quote is taken from an unclassified but unpublished 
- document, ~1e General Policies Governing Officers 
Assigned to the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committees and 
Agencies. 
do their "homework" in studying each problem. Their 
staffs assist them in this study. 
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Decision by the Chiefs. --The next step can now be 
taken: that is, the decision of the Chiefs. Each member, 
as prescribed by the National Security Act of 1947 
(revised), attends a meeting with his Operations Deputy. 
What goes on in their meetings must be ke~in the utmost 
confidence. The Secretary and Deputy Secretary keep an un-
official record of the proceedings to be used by them in 
the preparation of the decision. The decision of the 
Chiefs is officially recorded. 
Implementation. -- The final step is the implementation 
of the decision. This generally means forwarding a letter 
or a message to the pertinent agencies or individuals for 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff stating their decision or opinion. 
As stated in the beginning the purpose of this chapter 
bas been to provide the background information of the parent 
organization, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in order to under-
stand the various functions of the Joint Secretariat. History 
points to the constantly changing nature of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff brought about by the conflicting political philoso-
phies concerning its duties and position. While functions 
and organization as they exist today have been presented, 
it must be appreciated that the changing system has 
only been halted in flight. What is written today 
may be different tomorrow. But there is one function 
which must always exist in one form or another. That 
is the means by which military aspects of national 
decisions can be expressed and the method by which the 
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best thinking of many conflicting views -- not necessarily 
along service lines -- may be integrated into decision. 
Some system must exist to bring those ideas into focus 
quickly and thoroughly. The decision is the responsibility 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. But the method of bringing 
the ideas together in a form to permit decision is the 
function to which the Joint Secretariat ~ddresses itself 
adjusting its operation to the changes of its parent 
organization. 
CHAPTER III 
THE SECRETARIAT FUNCTIONS OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 
ORGA..l{IZATION 
1. The Requirement for a Secretariat by 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
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Features of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. --It is well 
to recall some of the unique features of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff which create a need for some form of a secre-
tariat. These follow: (a) The J.C.S. represents a tre-
mendous organization. It is a decision making mechanism 
to bring together into simple form many complex and di-
vergent ideas. (b) Its executive head is not an indi-
vidual, but a corporate body. This is true even though 
there is a Chairman. He is restricted by law so that 
he cannot demand decision or agreement from his associates. 
He cannot even cast a deciding vote. His control can only 
be exerted on the Joint Staff which prepares the studies. 
Nor is the Chairman under the orders of the Chiefs. There 
is a need for an executive body to carry out the orders 
or the Joint Chiers or Starr acting as a corporate body. 
This is particularly true since each of the Chiefs can 
only devote a part of his time to J.C.S. business. Each 
chief has the operations of his own service to supervise. 
It is for the performance of these executive duties that 
a secretariat is needed. (c) Many of the J.C.S. func-
tioning bodies are committees which require management 
and assistance. (d) Finally, and closely related to the 
other points, is the fact that each of the Chiefs of 
necessity is backed up by a large technical staff of his 
own service so that when he comes to a meeting of the 
Joint Chiefs he comes with the benefit of the study of 
the experts of his own service. The problems are too 
complex and technical for each Chief to have intimate 
knowledge of all ramifications from his own study or 
background experience. There will be more discussion 
of this aspect of the Joint Chiefs of Staff later as 
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it bears strongly on the development of the mode of opera-
tion in the Joint Secretariat. 
Scope of the term secretariat functions as used 
herein. -- In the first chapter it was apparent that 
there is no accepted definition of what is and what is not 
to be included as part of the secretariat functions. For 
this thesis there will be included in the meaning of 
secretariat function all aspects which assist in making 
the J.C.S. decision except those which make substantive 
contributions to the nature of the decision. This draws 
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a sharp line between the support functions performed 
by the secretariat and those performed by the Joint 
Staff. The latter suggest actual solutions to the 
problems and in so doing make substantive contributions 
to the decision. Considered from the organizational 
point of view~ the secretariat functions extend beyond 
the Joint Secretariat. They include those secretariat 
functions carried on within the staffs of each of the 
Chiefs. The attitude is taken in this thesis that 
secretariat functions are not a command authority but 
are a coordinating function crossing command lines. 
2. How the Secretariat Keeps the Executive Informed. 
To inform the 11executive 11 his advisory staff must 
also be informed. -- One of the functions common to all 
secretariats is 11Keeping the Executive Informed. 11 
is a primary function of the J.C.S. secretariat . 
This 
But what is meant by the executive? First there is the 
corporate body of the Chiefs~ but as already mentioned 
the vote of each Chief includes his own opinion backed 
up by the advice of his experts. For purposes of aid-
ing the J.C.S. decision process these experts must be 
included as part of the executive to be informed. Next., 
i f t he problem is complicated or technical~ and most of 
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them are, there must be ample time for the staffs to study 
t he problem and to advise their Chiefs. Often a pro-
blem will require extensive study and clearance by many 
people within the various staffs before it can be voted 
on properly by the Service Chief. 
This discussion suggests two specific requirements in 
the method of keeping the executive info~ned -- that is 
inform his advisory staff and give the members of that 
staff as much advanced notice as possible. Just as a 
large daily newspaper keeps its subscribers informed by 
a timely publishing and distributing of the news so does 
the Joint Secretariat keep the Chiefs of the Services, 
the action officers on their staffs and the members of the 
Joint Staff informed by a system of collecting, editing 
and publishing the business pertinent to the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff. 
The mechanics of mimeographing and distributing 
must be of a high order of efficiency. To give some 
measure of the meaning of 11high order of efficiency 11 a 
speci£1c example will be cited. At two o'clock in the 
afternoon an urgent paper of fifty pages is received in 
the rough. It can be edited, typed on stencils, mimeo-
graphed in 100 copies, assembled and made ready for 
delivery in the Officer messenger distribution satchels 
together with the necessary receipts in two hours' time. 
(Needless to say this degree of effort taxes every 
facility available.) 
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The limits on an indiscriminant publishing of infor-
mation. -- The problem of keeping the executive informed 
by furnishing papers to supporting members of the various 
staffs becomes complicatedJ because the security of 
information requires that it must be made available to 
the minimum number of people. This means that there must 
be a definite decision of who should get copies of a 
report and who should not. The basic idea of keeping 
the executive informed is to give all interested parties 
a copy of the written informationJ but to exclude those 
who do not have what is called a 11need to know 11 • In 
order to perform this function properly the secretariat 
must have an extensive knowledge of the organizational 
structure of each of the services as well as the nature 
of the problem involved. NaturallyJ there are distribu-
tion patternsJ and there is a system~r keeping those 
patterns up to date and for adapting them to each situa-
tion. Within each of the services are secretaries for 
the Chiefs who handle J.C.S. matters and guide the 
I 
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distribution of papers for their own services. These 
secretaries are not part of the organization called, 
Joint Secretariat, but since they are an essential 
element in the performance of the function of keeping 
the executive informed they must be included as units 
performing the secretariat function . This is one of the 
reasons why a discussion of the secretariat function can 
not be restricted to the Joint Secretariat . 
The kind of information needed by the "executive " . 
The matters to be prepared and distributed include: 
a . The assignment of the problem to committees. 
It is important that the Chiefs and their staffs know 
about a problem from its inception for even while 
the Joint Staff is preparing the study, the service 
staffs need to prepare their brief for their Chief. 
In addition members of a Service Staff furnish data 
and information for the working group of the Joint 
Staff. 
b . Relevant information data which may be received 
after a problem is assigned. 
c. The problem answer . This is the committee study . 
d . The implementation of the action. After the 
Chiefs' decision there is an announcement of their 
decision and the action to be taken. 
~·The pertinent comments of the Services. The 
Services may make alternate proposals. These are 
called "slants 11 or "purples " . 
. . 
f. Action or decision by higher authority. There 
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may also be a copy of the action taken by the Secretary 
of Defense or the National Security council based 
on J.C.S. advice. Since only a single copy of such 
ac t ion by external agencies may be received~ the 
secretariat may obtain permission to reproduce it 
to insure that all interested persons in the military 
side of the Department of Defense are made aware of 
the action. 
g. Corrections and changes. There are the cor-
rections and changes which must be made to documents. 
These latter are called 11Corrigendum". 
h. Agendas and reports. The foregoing list of 
documents tends to make a package for each problem. 
In addition the secretariat distributes copies of 
agenda and reports of the current status of problems. 
There is an inter-relationship between each of the 
papers described in the previous paragraph when they 
deal with the same problem. Obviously there must be a 
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system by which pertinent papers may be linked together. 
The external correspondence received by the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff must be copied and distributed to the appropriate 
individual in such a manner that it can be related to the 
pertinent problems. The system is not always clear-cut 
or simple because problems interlocked and some corres-
pondence received may influence several problems. Keep-
ing these matters straight is a responsibility of the 
secretariat. 
The security problem. -- This is an opportune time 
to consider one aspect of the security problem, and in 
turn the distribution problem concerning various J.C.S. 
papers. Each problem and paper has a security aspect 
related to its subject matter, but there is an additional 
security consideration for J.C.S. matters. Many of the 
papers which are distributed are not necessarily the 
opinions of the Chiefs. They are merely a proposed 
solution to a problem. They may not be what the Chiefs 
want at all, but nevertheless can have the same influence 
as £alse rumor, if improperly circulated. Therefore 
they must be restricted in their distribution to those 
who understand their tentative status. Further, even 
after the problem solution has been passed upon by the 
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Chiefs, it still must be kept in an abnormally limited 
circle. This is particularly true of advice which the 
Chiefs are furnishing to the Secretary of Defense or the 
President. The final decision by those individuals may 
be different from the advice of the Chiefs. There are 
two very important ethical points involved. The data 
and/or advice of the Chiefs must not become a matter 
which ean be used as a political lever to influence na-
tional decision unduly. It must exert its influence by 
virtue of its merit or importance relative to other 
factors. The second ethical point involves the influence 
of the national decision upon the military thinking of 
the Chiefs. The military reasoning and facts still exist, 
but the national decision, involving political factors, 
may nullify or amend the military opinion. In future 
considerations such external and higher level decision 
must be integrated into future military advice. This 
can be made a lot simpler by concrete illustration. The 
Joint Chiefs of Staff may study the intelligence data and 
arrive at a decision that to provide adequate national 
security certain forces of men and material are needed. 
These may generate a budget figure which may be judged to 
be too high by the President. Obviously the planning has 
79 
to be based upon the P:...esident.•s decis i on_, but the basic 
data is not completely worthless . It may be of value 
to future planners. It means, however, that such data 
must receive a particular kind of distribution to insure 
that it is limited to those who know how to use it. 
There is still another way to look upon the handling 
of J.C.S. papers. An individual preparing a thesis or a 
magazine article scribbles off many notes. Often he is 
not satisfied with their wording. They may not say what 
he means -- they may even have a different connotation 
than he intends. These are notes. They are the property 
of the individual. He need not show them to anyone else , 
but at the same time they can contain valuable information 
that he does not wish to destroy. He can keep them for 
future reference. 
In many ways the J.C.S. decision process has many 
aspects which are anal-ogous t o the above. Much of the 
thinking is reduced to paper which is similar to scribbled 
notes. Except that the J.C.S. process does not involve 
one individual, and to provide proper integration of many 
minds the 11scribbled 11 notes have to be typewritten, 
mimeographed, and distributed to other units of the 
ff collective 11 mind. In the end many of these papers are of 
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value similar to the "scribbled" notes of the student 
. . 
preparing a thesis. They stimulate the development of 
thought, but they often do not say what is desired in 
the final product. It is part of the secretariat function 
to ·provide for the distribution or thought -- at the same 
time insuring that the "scribbled" notes do not go astray. 
The discussion of the distribution aspects of the 
function to flkeep the executive informed" has been ex-
tensive in order to convey some idea of the kind of work 
which a secretariat performs. There is a judgment factor 
involved . It has nothing to do with the actual decision. 
It requires that the secretariat have a broader point of 
view than any of the groups preparing studies. It re-
quires an awareness of the relationship of each problem 
to the functions of each part of the Department of Defense 
and to the Government as a whole. It requires that the 
secretariat be alert to design, maintain and modify a 
system which will perform the function. 
3. Concurrences 
In the J.C.S. organization the method or obtaining con-
currences is built into the system. -- In the first chapter 
there was discussion or the importance of obtaining con-
currence from the various parts of an organization. The 
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Department of State has a place in its format to indicate 
concurrences (Appendix C). This function is so fundamental 
to smooth government operation that it cannot be neglected. 
It is also emphasized as fundamental in the coordination 
of large businesses. Executives have frequently stated 
that their most important job is to see that one decision 
does not interfere with another. This is likewise im-
portant to J.C.S. decisions. But the Joint Chiefs of Starr 
coordinates such a large organization that the normal 
system of circulating the study from office desk to office 
desk to obtain the necessary concurring initials would 
become an endless process. The paper would not get to 
all pertinent people by the time the decision was needed. 
The functions of obtaining concurrences is performed in 
the J.C.S. organization by the system of distributing 
copies of the study far enough in advance of the date of 
its consideration that nonconcurring offices may be given 
an opportunity to express their points of view to their 
own Chief 1 who carefully weighs the importance of each 
nonconcurrence before submitting his vote. The secretariat 
responsibility is to see that the papers are distributed 
far enough ·in.'ladv..ance to give all interested offices a 
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chance to study and comment. The secretariat does not 
ask for comments. It merely dist:ributes the information, 
and it is the responsibility of a nonconcurring group 
to initiate an objection through their respective Chiefs. 
From the above discussion it must be obvious that no paper 
can be delayed in the Secretariat. The system is so de-
signed that a paper in process is under continual sur-
veillance . If it slows dm'ln in its normal pit' ogress 
through the system for more than one half hour at any 
point , the reason for the slow down is immediately investi-
gated .. 
4. How Action is Assigned. 
The Joint Secretariat has the responsibility to assign 
action. -- The function of assigning action to the various 
co~nittees is an important act of the secretariat, but it 
is not an arbitrary one. Several steps are involved. 
First a search is made of background data to find similar 
problems in order to relate the new problem to its proper 
field. This may be a matter of geographical area, organi-
zational concept, weapon policy or a wide variety of other 
classifications. Over two thousand different subjects 
have been required to classify J.C.S. policies and some of 
the subjects have had over 2000 pertinent papers issued 
under this heading. Once the subject area is decided it 
83 
it is generally a logical matter to determine to which 
committee the action should be assigned. The pattern of 
committee charters generally is the guide. (Appendix H) 
is a sample of a charter. However the matter is discusse d 
wi th military secretaries of each committee who advise 
their commit tee members. This gives a committee an op-
portunity to suggest that the problem does not fall with i n 
its cognizance. Such a committee action may be frustrating 
to the secretariat, but it is fundamentally a good prin-
ciple. It requires that the secretariat must always base 
an assignment of action on a thorough initial study. It 
prevents the secretariat from assuming a power and con-
trol which it was never intended to have. Actually, very few 
problems are ever rejected by a committee. The secre-
tariat1s logic in selecting the committee is usually 
accepted. There is also a brake on the committee re-
jection. If the disagreement over an acceptance of a 
problem comes to a show down the matter will have to be 
settled by the Director of the Joint Staff which can 
prove to be very embarassing. Secondly, there is a limit 
of the jockeying back and forth over the acceptance of 
the problem. This is provided by a time limit. Generally 
if a problem has not been assigned within three or four 
hours its discussion has reached a fairly high level. 
in the echelon of command. This prevents delaying tac-
tics which cannot be permitted . After the problem is 
assigned the assignment is formalized in writing and 
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the problem description and its assignments are cir-
culated to all services and to pertinent committees. One 
committee always has primary cognizance of a problem. 
Collaboration may be volunteered by other committees or 
may be requested by the committee having primary cogni-
zance. The arrangements for this are made between the 
individual committee secretaries. 
5 . Follow-up. 
Following up of the assignment is an important part 
of the Secretariat's function . --The first step is to 
establish a deadline for committee work. This suspense 
date wherever possible should allow at least two weeks for 
study by the Chiefs prior to appearing on the agenda. The 
r~maining time is available to the committee and the Joint 
Staff Groups. Obviously some problems do not permit such 
a generous schedule of time, and a committee deadline still 
must be selected to permit at least two meetings o~ the 
Chiefs to debate the issue. 
Once the committee deadline date is set, the method of 
follow-up is merely a matter of reporting status. The 
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problem, its due date, and its location in the system 
of progress from committee to Chiefs for action, to 
Chairman for signature, to Secretary of Defense for 
necessary action is reported at regular intervals, i.e. 
each month or, for some problems, each week. The secre-
tariat acts as an information agency on the progres3 of 
\'Jet·k, bu t it does not take on the function of conscience: 
it does not prod. 
6. Agenda Preparation 
The function which the secretariat performs in pre-
oaring an agenda is primarily a procedural matter. -- In 
theory the power to direct the attention of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff away from certain areas and into other 
areas by the agenda could be a powerful control. By 
laN this power has been assigned to the Chairman. However, 
the right of each Chief to introduce a problem is recog-
nized so that there is no exclusive authority to censor 
the topics of discussion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
The Chairman does screen the requests for J.C.S. advice 
which come from outside sources such as the various offices, 
under the Secretary of Defense, or from unified commands. 
Also since the Joint Staff acts as an advisory group to 
the staff of the Secretary of Defense, many problems are 
handled without demanding the decision of the Chiefs. 
The secretariat function in the preparation of the 
agenda is a matter of timing and coordinating. This 
part of the function requires a thorough knowledge 
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of the status of each problem and a means of checking 
with the secretaries for J.C.S. matters in each of the 
services . There is only a small margin of discretion 
of judgment left to the secretariat. This is to deter-
mine whether the problem should be scheduled for con-
sideration by the Operations Deputies prior to decision 
by the Chiefs. This description of the preparation of 
the agenda may leave the impression that it is a simple 
matter. This is not true. It is simple only to the 
extent that no policy decisions need be made by the 
secretariat. The complication arises because of the 
endless amount of detail which must be coordinated to 
insure that the problem studies are ready~ and that 
the various Chiefs have been properly briefed by their 
service staffs. Fart of the system is to publish a 
tentative agenda for use or those responsible for pre-
paring the study in order that they may prepare their 
11 Brief,s 11 for the Director and the Chairman or f'or the 
Secretary on the Staff of a Service Chief to schedule 
the briefings needed by his service chief. This also is 
an example of coordination through publishing informa-
tion -- a declaration of intention to permit dissenters 
the opportunity to lodge objection. 
7. Staff Study Review and Implementation of Decisions 
To be ready for decision by the Chiefs a paper 
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must recommend action. -- Two of the functions discussed 
in the first chapter will be treated together in this 
discussion. They are (a) the review of staff studies 
to insure they are ready for consideration by the Chiefs, 
(b) the implementation of the decision. Every study 
to be reviewed by the Chiefs must be limited to two 
pages of text. This is ample to give the essential 
information for decision. Amplifying tables and discus-
sion may be attached. Generally the staff study format 
is used. All studies are reviewed by the secretariat 
for form, simplicity of expression and brevity. The most 
important requirement is that the report must have con-
clusions and must make recommendations which can be im-
plemented. It is not truly a recommendation to say 
t: It is recommended that the Secretary of Defense be 
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informed of t he conclusions of this paper . 11 Rather it 
should be uit is recommended that the attached letter, 
which reflects the conclusions of paragraph 11X 11 be 
forwarded to the Secretary of Defense. 1; And then the 
actual letter which is to be implemented should be 
attached . . This means that the Chiefs can approve the 
exact words which are to be sent to the Secretary of 
Defense. It is the insistence upon this type of recom-
mendation which gains for the J.C.S. organization the 
reputation of performing such outstanding 11completed 
staff work; . Once the papers have been reviewed to 
insure that they are ready for executive action the im-
plementation step becomes a relatively simple process. 
The letter or message which was attached as a recommenda-
tion is right there in the report, and whatever changes 
the Chiefs make to it can be indicated by the Secretary 
when he writes up the decisions of the meeting. This 
system makes it possible for the editors to prepare 
implementing letters based upon a simple note from the 
Secretary, which he can ' send out while the session of 
the Joint Chiefs is still in progress. This means the 
implementation of urgent matters can be started before 
a meeting is completed. Often, in fact, a letter is 
ready for the Chairman ts signature before the meeting 
is over . 
8. The Record of J.C.S. Decisions 
11And so while the great ones retire to their 
dinner the Secretary stays getting thinner and thinner, 
racking his brains to recall and record what he thinks 
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they think that they ought to have thought. 11 Allanbrook .* 
The most important function performed by members of the 
Joint Secretariat is the recording of minutes and decisions 
of the meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Secre-
tary and Deputy Secretary, as the senior members of the 
Secretariat perform this function personally. Writing 
about this function is extremely difficult because of 
the security aspects of the problem. What goes on 
in a meeting of the Chiefs is always a carefully guarded 
matter of secrecy. Perhaps the best which can be stated 
on this subject can be quoted from 11Notes on British 
Secretarial System, 1942 u by Brigadier V. Dykes, 
British Army .** 
* Source of this bit of whimsey is a framed scroll 
-- appearing upon the wall in the Office of the Secretary, 
Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
** These notes were used in setting up the Secretariat 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Though unclassified they 
are not available in a published form. 
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''The recording of the discussion is done by 
the Secretary t aking a long-hand note and dictating 
minutes . Any attempt to make verbatim record is a 
waste of time, as in practice it is found that there 
is always a great deal of repetition in a discussion. 
It is the Secretary's job to sort the discussion out 
and set it down logically, omitting all minor or 
irrelevant matters. The main thing is to get the 
conclusions correct, and this takes a good deal of 
experience. It is exceptional for the Secretary to 
have conclusions clearly summarized for him by the 
Chairman at the end of the discussion! 
11 It will usually be found convenient to 
employ two Secretaries, one of whom concentrates 
to keep a record of the discussion, and the other, 
\'tho should be the senior, concentrates on getting 
the conclusions of the meeting . These conclusions 
must be accurately and decisively drafted if t hey 
are to be of anyr:~alue for subsequent action by 
the executive departments.u 
C· 
There are other points from Brigadier General 
Dykes notes wq±ch are pertinent to the functions of 
recording minutes and decisions . 
11 (It is not the Secretary's job to suggest 
the decisions which should be taken -- that is the 
Connni ttee 's job.) 11 · 
"After the meeting" . . . the secretary 
is.sues a '.'"Qrief record, setting out the principal 
points of.the discussion, and the decisions reached 
in the form of definite conclusions on which staffs 
can take executive action, even without further 
reference to the principals who attended the 
actual meeting. " 
9. Administrative Functions 
Supervise security. Within the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff Organization there is a factor which influences 
the performance of every function. This factor in the 
maintenance security. There are three aspects to the 
matter: reliable personnel; physical security of 
spaces, safes area etc.; and the classification and 
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safeguarding of documents. Each of these aspects has its 
own elaborate system, and each carried to the extreme 
could completely strang-le the output of any constructive 
work. A fine sense of judgment is necessary to apply 
security restrictions intelligent+Y· It is time-consuming 
detailed work. The secretariat assumes as many of the 
security functions as it is possible to assume in order 
to relieve those charged with planning of such details. 
Provide continuity. -- The maintenance of continuity 
in the J.C.S. organization is provided by the civilian 
staff of the secretariat. As a matter of policy the 
military officers do not remain in the organization 
longer than two years. Some civil service employees have 
been with the Joint Chiefs of Staff since its creation 
in 1942. These people provide the 11experience factor". 
' ' They can remember the papers which were produced to meet 
the crises of Korea or Suez. Their stories about how 
11Beetle 11 Smith handled the Secretariat, or what General 
. . 
Gruenther said, or 11Ernie 11 King's position on a matter 
provides an atmosphere which is a frequent reminder of 
the importance of the work of the staff of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff. Perhaps the greatest contribution 
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of these civilians is their great loyalty. Over the 
years they observed the struggles of new ideas against 
old. They have patience to watch and wait for the solid 
concept of war strategy which always finally emerges 
from such struggles. They help produce an atmosphere 
for creative thinking. They lend an air of steadiness. 
Investigate new methods. --The most interesting 
work of the secretariat, other than the recording of the 
decisions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is the explora-
tion of new methods of presenting ideas. The whole 
reason behind the secretariat review of a staff study 
before it is submitted to the Chiefs for their action is 
to insure that it minimizes the demands on their time. 
Strict adherence to one format or system might tend to 
stereotype the thinking. While the secretariat should 
not try to contribute to the substance of any decision, 
it is completely within secretariat duties to explore 
methods or presenting ideas ror action. There is a 
whole field of communication methods using diagrams, 
schematic pictures, statist~cal bar graphs and photo-
graphs. There is the method of oral presentation using 
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charts. The secretariat assumes as one of its responsi-
bilities the exploration of new and improved methods 
. 
of presenting ideas . 
Closely associated to the exploration of new methods 
of presenting ideas is the study of the methods of re-
search. Perhaps this duty can best be suggested by a 
f ew comparisons. The average student has access to 
f acts set forth in indexed books, these are arranged 
in library systems . He has benefit of periodical and 
newspaper indexes. His source of material is codified 
and the system has been in effect for many, many years. 
Even if he has a more involved problem like researching 
the Adams papers or the Roosevelt notes, he still has a 
recognized system to follow . For the secretariat the 
problem is much more involved . What facts are needed 
to fight a war? or to prevent a war? War taxes all man 1s 
knowledge, and the plans for war may require the most 
minute detail or the latest new idea. The secretariat 
explores the system of how to codify and classify 
knowledge which may need to be recalled on short notice 
f or war planning. Some of the sources are those which 
are available in libraries; some are new ideas, some 
are old plans. The data can be endless, but there must 
be selection and choice. This is the problem of re-
search to be explored by the secretariat. 
10. The 11Authority 11 of the Secretariat 
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There have already been several references to the 
lack of authority of the secretariat. --First, the 
secretariat functions extend beyond the organizational 
structure of the Joint Secretariat, so that there is no 
direct command authority. Second, the Joint Secretariat, 
though it performs the function of assigning problems to 
committees cannot force any committee to accept the 
assignment. Third, in carrying out the follow-up func-
tion the Joint Secretariat cannot insist that the com-
mittees meet their deadlines. \ihere, then, is its 
power to carry out its functions? There are two funda-
mental sources. First from its knowledge, and second 
from the services it performs for the committees. 
The secretariat 11 knows" what the Chiefs want. The 
secretary and the Deputy Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff attend the meetings and know the intent of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Further, the secretariat per-
sonnel are in constant telephone or personal contact 
with each other exchanging information about developments. 
·+ 
The Joint Secretariat as a result has a complete 
knowledge of all aspects of J .c .S . . work. It is the 
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source of information. If the secretariat does not know 
the answer, it will get it. The result is merely an 
example of "knowledge is power 11 • Needless to say, the 
continuation of such power depends upon having accurate 
knowledge, and the ethics require that furnishing or 
withholding information cannot be used as an award or 
punishment for cooperation. The single criteria to 
determine whether or not an individual should receive in-
I S 
formation if his 11need to know". 
The other source of 11power 11 is the performance of 
services~ These include the editorial advice, mimeo~aph­
ing, message and mail distributing which includes high-
lighting the essential and urgent from the mass of 
routine or informational. For example the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff receives 16,000 messages per month. These must be 
culled , divided, and distributed. An action officer is 
called by telephone to inform him of a particularly 1m-
portant message, before itreaches his desk by the usual 
internal mail system . 
The very fact that the secretariat does not influence 
the substance of decisions places it in a unique position 
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to assist in their expression. It must be remembered 
that the Joint Chiefs of Staff Organization~ including 
the Chiefs themselves~ and their Joint Staff are required 
to struggle with new concepts~ to 11 inventu new operational 
' ' 
procedures for the most complex of human undertaking 
war. Those who 11 invent" the new concepts frequently 
become stymied in their expression. The fact that there 
exists a group whose function is to express a thought~ 
not invent it~ gives the 11 inventor 11 a boost over his 
limitations in expression~ He can seek advice on how 
to express the thought without receiving a lot of 
11 static 11 or opposition to the thought itself. This is 
an example of the kind of service which a secretariat 
performs and which gives it a 11power 11 to expedite the 
work of the Joint Chiefs of Staff without having au-
thority to give orders. 
11. Secretariat Organization 
The "nerve '1 system. -- The foregoing discussion 
gives some idea of the functions performed by the secre-
tariat of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The next step 
is to investigate the organization which is -required 
to carry out those duties. There is attached as 
Appendix J an organization chart of the Joint Secretariat~ 
but as has already been suggested the secretariat 
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extends beyond the command limit of the Secretary. The 
Joint Secretariat is merely a central point. The secre-
t ariat system pararl~els the whole J.C.S. organization 
which was described in the second chapter. The secre-
tariat is the 11nerve 11 system for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
. . 
For a complete picture of the secretariat organization 
there should be added to the chart lines-of-cooperation 
extending to the secretaries for J.C.S. affairs attached 
to the immediate staffs of each of the Service Chiefs 
and from them down to the secretaries of each of the 
experts whose job it is to brief the Chief. 
As can be seen on the chart for the Joint Secretariat 
there are indicated secretaries for each of the committees. 
These secretaries perform many of the same functions for 
each of the committees of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as 
the secretary performs for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In 
addition they are the points of contact for the Secretary~ 
hi s Deputy and the Executive Secretary of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff in dealing with the committees. This means that 
in assigning problems it is the committee secretary who 
is contacted~ and when ·a study is ready for editing it 
is the committee secretary who delivers it to the editors 
and works with them in making any necessary editorial 
changes. 
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The immediate Joint Secretariat organization is 
divided along functional lines. The Coordination and 
Evaluation section assigns problems~ maintains the follow-
up records~ and performs the mechanical process of pro-
ducing the agenda. The Editorial and Implementation 
Section reviews the studies for format and implements the 
decisions. The Minutes and Reports produces the stencils 
for mimeographing. The Message Center handles the mail 
and messages and in addition mimeographs the reports. 
Their output is about one half million sheets of paper per 
month. In addition that section delivers the various 
classified papers to the services and committees. The 
Research and Records Analysis Section maintains the files~ 
produces the indexes~ and assists in the necessary re-
search in the study of a problem. The Presentation 
Section prepares graphic aids and charts for oral pre-
sentations. The other sections perform administrative 
support duties for the J.C.S. organization as a whole. 
CONCLUSIONS 
(_ 
Wherever great amounts of material and great numbers 
of men must be coordinated into action there must be 
decision. vfuerever the process iS complicated there will 
be different ideas as t _o how to proceed. 'Wherever there 
is a desire to select the most favorable method from the 
variety of ideas of how to proceed there needs to be a 
system by which those ideas can be expressed . Wherever 
it is necessary to save time in the use of that system 
secretariat functions must be performed . The secretariat 
is a tool which has been used to assist in making the major 
military decisions of our country during the past fifteen 
years. 
This thesis has presented an example of a successfully 
operating secretariat. The factors which have lead to its 
success can be summarized. There was a definite need for 
the performance of its functions. It has a well designed 
methodology. It has had top level support. It has had 
excellent personnel to perform its functions. 
There is one factor which makes the secretariat of 
the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff unique . 
It has performed its functions without grabbing power 
-viii-
or seeking authority. It has made itself essential 
by virtue of doing its job well . This characteristic 
has lent it f~exibility to adapt to the changing functions, 
personalities and systems of the organization it serves , 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
-ix-
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CABINET REPORTING AND FOLLOW-UP 
On major Cabinet recommendations, the President may 
frequently wish to defer his decision for several hours or 
days to allow for thorough reflection and consideration. 
The Presidential Action Summary will be drafted by the 
Cabinet Secretary clearly specifying for each item the decision, 
the action required, and the locus of responsibility. 
This Summary, when approved by the President, is itself 
to constitute the President's directive to the agencies for 
action. The Summary is to be the only written record dis-
Tbe White Houoo PA-3Z 




The Preeident bae taken the followina action oft the ileme preeented at 
tbe 3Zad Cabinet Meotina: 
Item 
1 . Fuiure Schedule of Cabinet Neetinae 
ACTION: The Prooidont requoota that tbo Cabinet 
meet at 10:00 A.M. on Tueeclaye ae well 
ae Friday• until further notice. 
Document 
!:!!!!!!!!!! 
Z. Review of Loono vo. Grant Policy CP-31/1 
ACTION: Tho Pruident approvoo thio popor, with 
tbe firot poraaraph ao rovioed durin1 tho . 
Cabinet Meotlna, dirocta ita implomontation 
by tbe Director of Foroian Oporationo, aDd 
requeeu a Proar••• Report prior to the 
Cabinet Mootin& of September 3, 1954. 
3. /ftem 3 put over to moetina of JUDo II ;:1 
4 . New Devolopmento Affecti"' Aaricultural Loaiolation CP-37 
ACTION: The Preoidont deforo decioion on thlo pro-
pooal until after hio conference witb loaio-
lative leader• on June 14 . 
5 . Report on Group Hoopital aDd Modica! Pro.ram for CP-14 
tributed of the results of Cabinet meetings. Fodera! Employeu 
-
____________________________ :::___ ____ ~-------------~A=C~T~IO~N~:~The Preoident directa tho lludaot Director 
The Cabinet Secretary will give to the Departmental 
Special Assistants orally as full information about Cabinet 
discussions as is necessary to get assignments understood and 
action under way. 
When appropriate, brief Progress Reports are to be sub-
mitted on major matters by the responsible Agency. 
Progress Reports and other informational Cabinet Papers 
will be reproduced on yellow paper. 
19 
to-oxpodite-cle&ullC.LOLtM.LllroDOood ' 
1e1illation for au.bmileion to the Coqreee 
at thio Seuion. 
6 . [.Wormationai· it om only J 
7 . [.Informational item only -;:,1 
ADDITIONAL ITEMS 
A . Cooperation with the Commheioa on Oraani&&tion 
of the Executive Branch of the Government 
ACTION: Tho Preoidont requeoto eacb Deportment concerned 
to make epecial efforte to provide the Hoover Com-
million with what it needa to complete ita work 
promptly -- poroonnol for detail, haole otatiotical 
material, etc . 
B . The Study o! Ameli can Hiotory 
ACTION: The Prooidont roquooto Cabinet Mombero to include 
in public addrouu tboy may be maltina in tho DOxt 
aeveral montha, where appropriate, eome of the 
material preaented at the laat Preaidential pre11 
conference on the importance ol the atudy ol 
American hiatory. 
/Thio material io boina circulated ao CI-44;-/ 
- . -
Maxwell M . Rabb 
Secretary to the Cabinet 
• • • 
CABINET STAFF .OPERATIONS: FORMS AND PROCEDURES 
THE CABINET AGENDA 
Major items should reach this agenda only after they have 
undergone some joint study by the interested Agencies-
refining the problems, spelling out the agreements, and 
identifying the disagreements. 
This study can be arranged on an ad hoc basis by ~e 
Cabinet Secretary, working through the appropriate Depart-
mental Special Assistants. 
Each agenda item, other than the most exceptional cases, 
should be accompanied by a document, if only a one-
paragr~ph· description of a proposed informational item. 
Cabinet agendas and documents are to be distributed at 
least two days in advance of the Cabinet meeting, two copies 
of each going directly to the Departmental Special Assistants 








11:00 AM:-F"riTaJ, Tun.""'i:""ts.t 





l. bview oll..oaA• u. Orant Polley CP·ll 
l. Aavtew of 1M EcOIIom·lc Sh~Uoa Cl-41 
4. New Development• AHecUn1 CP·11 
Aaricu.lt\lral 1A1l1i&tlon 
S, Aaport on Group Hoepltal and 
Medical Pro1ram lor federal 
E';!~i!::;u~·.~::::a:,:, 
4 , Bl-Montblr Summary of Labor 
U&rht Onelopments ln illi&lor 
~ 
CP·14 
Cl - J! 
CA • JZ 
Ju.M I, 1U4 
Pn .. n'-d 
____!!.__ 
TIM PnddeDI: 
The Dlndor ol 
Fonlan Opt! raUon• 
Cbalrmaa., Council 
ot Ecoaotrdc Advbe n 
TN Sec ntary ol 
'Aarlcultv.n 
11M Pn1Weac•e 
Advhor oa Penoaael 
Maaal•m•at; tiM Und•r 
1.-c:ntary ot H .. llb. 
Educactoa. aM W•llan 
TIM h e ntary ol 
Labor 
7 , TO NOT£: Prosnu R.eport on U.. 
a.lus•• Prosnm 
Cl-19 (T~ S.cntary of 
Slat.} 
Maxwtill .. . l.&bb 






THE CABINET BRIEF 
Cabinet Papers which are over one page in length are to be 
accompanied by a one-page Brief, to be prepared ·by the 
responsible Agency. 
The Brief should follow the five-section format specified 
here. · 
Cabinet Briefs and Papers which are awaiting Cabinet dis-
cussion will be reproduced by the Office of the Cabinet Sec-
retary on blue paper. When approved by the President they 
will be reproduced, with any necessary revisions, on white 




Juno 1, 1954 
...... ~~ 
e,\"'' 
e;,<:?<() REVI_EW ~ ~~ ~ ~ 
BRIEF 
Problem : Can emall underdeveloped nation• 1a!ely &IIUme lncre&lld 
---- loan obllaatlono to the U.S.? U not, oho~l_d the U, S. 
con alder makina more a rant. lnatead of loan•? 
Dhcuaeion: The International Bank and the Secretary of the Trea1ury 
have been concerned that the lona·ranae economic etablllty 
of certain emaller underdeveloped coWltrlee may be en-
danaered by ever-increaein1 •••umptiosu, on . their part, of 
repayment obllaation• to the U.S. for re1ource-development 
loano , (Memorandum from the Bank attached ao Tab A.) 
To lncreaae the proportion of U. S. arant lunda to theee 
countrte 1 would remove thh danae r. 
Conolotent with the Intent of Conareoo and In tba lnterooto 
of economy, U. S . policy up to now b&e been to Umit a rant 
fuach for reaource·development to 35~ of over-all Techn.lcal 
Aaalatance expenditure a. The required lncreaaed proportion 
would be 41,., 
lncreaolna thlo proportion would reqlliro (a) OJHclal 
advance conaultation with the Conareaa now, (b) arileDdina the 
preoent draft of the Mutual Security Bill (propooed lanauaae 
attached ao Tab B) and (c) preJHrina further teotlmony In 
tupport o! the amendment. It h eatimated that Conaret· 
olonal leade ro would be wllllna to oupport ouch a cbanae In 
policy , 
Recommendation• : That the Preaident approve the Director o! Forelan 
Ope ratlona' requeatina Conareaa to amend the Mutual 
Security Act cbanalna U.S. loan-arant policy to allow 41" 
of Technical Aoolotance Fund o to be uood for a rant aid . 
Implementation: U the Prealdent approve a tbla paper, the Director 
of Forelan Ope ratlono will conoult with Senator Wiley and 
Conareaaman Cblperfield, and will annOUftce the new policy 
before the International Development -Adviaory Board next 
week, The Aaahtant Secretary 0! State !or Economic Affaira 
will include a aupportin1 reference to tbia new ~llcy iD a 
Speech in Seattle on June ZO. 
The Director o! Foreian Ope ration a will aubmit a 
proare11 report to the Cabinet within three montha . 
Concurrence a: The Secretary o! State 
The Secretary o! the Treaaury 
Attachment : PaJNr on thlo oubject prepared by the Director of 
Fore ian Ope rationa • 
. 












Organization & Management 
POLICIES and programs are established by the Commission U 
pursuant to the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act. The 
Commissioners confer and act as a body on import~nt 
matters of policy, pro~ams, and administration. The 
General Manager is directed by the Commission to discharge 
the executive and administrative functions of the Commis-
sion;2 and is responsible to the Commission for the formu-
tion of ~olicies and programs by the AEC's program di-
visions. 
l U.S . Government Organization 
Manual . l953-54 
2 CM 935, 11/3/53, Delegation · 
of Authority to the GM 
A POLICY CODE will be compiled and maintained1 as an aid to U 
the Commissioners and General Manager, and as a matter 
of information to the staff, The Code will contain onl! 
currently effective general policies of the Commission. 
1 Executive Session, 9/27/53, 
Policy Modification Paper 
Implementation: Memo GM to Secretary 
10/15/53 
2 AEC 753, 8/27/54 
Issued: 9/15/54 
Note: The material in the above statement is used only 
for the purpose of illustrating the form and con-






THE PUBLIC WILL BE PROVIDED THE FACTS about atomic U 
energy ~nd _ the d~velopments in the program upon which 
the citizenry can intelligently act insofar as securi-
ty requirements permit. It is the responsibility of 
agencies of public communication to disseminate facts~ 
to interpret them and give the meaning~ and to hold 
public servants accountable for their conduct of the 
people's business.l The AEC will not interfere in 
this area nor with public discussion of questions 
arising from the development of atomic weapons.2 The 
general public will be informed of AEC activities by 
such means as semiannual reports to Congress~3 speeches 
by AEC and contractors' officials~ press releases~ 
articles~ films~ and visua~ materials.4 
Issued: 9/19/54 
1 CM 236~ 1/26/49~ 5th SAR 
pp 10.5~ 116; IM 48-20/1~ 
4/28/48 
2 CM 409, 5/17/50~ AEC 111/12; 
also, 8th SAE pp. 229-30 
3 AE Act~ Sec. 251 
4 CM 146~ 1/28/48, 3rd SAR 
pp. 24-27; also Memo to 
Chairman from Director 
Information Services~ 9/22/53 
Note: The material in the above statement is used only for 
the purpose of illustrating the form and content of 
the Code. 
SAMPLE 
• • • ~(/~.f.~ s:_~ 
DEPUTY DIRECTOR 
FOR 
STRATEGIC PLANS I <I ~ 
1-d 





PLANS SECTION POLICY SECTION 
WHITE ( SHORT-RANGE ) C CMD. ORGN. BASES ) GOLD 
RED ( MID-RANGE NATO ) I S I LV E R 
GRAY ( LONG-RANGE ATOMIC ENERGY ) I RAINBOW I I 
TAN ( EUR. AFRICA. LANT ) ( BUD, MIL AID ) I G R E E N 
PURPLE ( MIDDLE EAST CBR. MISSILES ) I BRONZE 
BLUE I C FE. PACIFIC. SEA ) UNTL AFFAIRS. SCHOOLS ) I cRy s T A L I I 
B LAC K I (CONUS. CONTL AIR DEF) 
AJ?PEN"DIX H 
I JOLWT STRATEGIC PLft~S COMMITTEE 
I 
The Joint Strategic Plans Committee (JSPC) is the 
agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff charged with the 
preparatiorl of joint studies and plans on current and 
future strategy and related military policy, the coordina-
tion of st1ategic plans of the Armed Forces, and with the 
formulation of policies for joint training and education. 
I 
Functions: 1 
The Jbint Strategic Plans Committee is responsible 
to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for: 
I 
a. Recommendations as to the requirements for, 
and-as to the strategic direction and deplo~nent of, · 
the military forces of the United States, including 
guidapce for operational control of forces and for 
the cpnduct of combat operations. 
I 
b. : The preparation of strategic plans, except 
those
1 
pertaining to psychological warfare and un-
conventional warfare studies and estimates, taking 
into consideration all phases and forms of warfare. 
I 
c. Formulation, as appropriate, of all major 
proje6ts and plans for optional operations in the 
light[ of strategic plans, and recommendations thereon; 
and f
1
or biological, and other types of warfare except 
psychological and unconventional in areas of actual 
or pr1ojected military operations; the review of all 
such iPlans made by other agencies, and recommenda-
tion~ concerning the military aspects thereof. 
d .1 Recommendations concerning the establishment 
o£,-and missions ~or, unified commands, specified 
commdnds, and other commands in strategic areas when 
in the interests of national security. 
e . Recommendations on the means required for the 
exercise of unified command ~ and recommendations 
on the assignment to individual military departments 
of the responsibility for providing such means . 
f . Recommendations on strategic guidance to be 
provided members of the United States Armed Forces 
participating in the preparation of combined plans 
for military action in conjunction with the armed 
forces of other nations ~ and the review , as appro -
priate~ of such combined plans . 
&· Formulation of policies for joint training 
of the military forces . 
h . Formulation of policies for coordination of the 
joint education of members of the military forces. 
i . Formulation of strategic guidance for use by the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff in providing military advice to 
the President~ the National Security Council ~ the 
Secretary of Defense~ and for such other purposes as 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff may direct . 
1 · Review of such reports, studies, estimates, and 
plans of other agencies within or without the organi -
zation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as are referred 
to them by the Joint Chiefs of Staff . 
k . Maintain effective ~ full , complete and early 
collaboration with counterpart organizations of the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense on all matters 
where such collaboration is appropriate , in order 
to insure broad participation in strategic and 
logistic planning in the early and developmental 
stages of staff work on any major problem being 
considered. 
APPENDIX I 
JOllifT STRATEGIC PLANS GROUP 
The Joint Strategic Plans Group (JSPG) is the agency 
of the Joint Staff charged with the preparation of joint 
plans and studies on current and future strategy and 
military policy as directed by the Director of the Joint 
Staff or by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee. 
Functions: 
The Joint Strategic Plans Group, under the direction 
of the Deputy Director for Strategic Plans, and as addi-
tionally directed by the Director of the Joint Staff or 
the Joint Strategic Plans Committee: 
a. Prepares joint war plans~ strategic studies and 
estimates and related staff work on current military 
strategy and policy. 
b. Prepares plans, studies and recommends policies 
on joint training, education and organization. 
c. Reviews the strategic plans prepared by commands 
established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and recommends 
action to effect coordination of such plans. 
d. Provides strategic guidance to other agencies 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Organization as may be 
necessary and appropriate for the fulfillment of 
their functions. 
e. Recommends provisions for the strategic direction 
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CHECK LIST FOR PREPARATION OF STAFF STUDIES AND BRIEFING MEMORANDA 
A brief, clear identification of the subject. 
DISCUSSION: 
Must Secretary or,.Under Secretary review or act on this problem? 
. ·~~ ' . ' :, 
Must he act at this time? 
Does this study fully meet the requirements of the original action assignment? 
Does this me,;,orandum leave any significant question unanswered? 
Is it on one pa~? 
Are all pertinent papers mentioned in study attached as tabs? 
Have copies been prepared for distribution to all areas having a legitimate interest? 
RECOMMENDATION: 
Are recommendations specific and clear? 
Is there a convenient place for the Secretary or Under Secretary to indicate approval 
or disapproval? 1 
CONCURRENCES: 
Have all interested areas cleared? 
Are all clearances at the appropriate (generally Bureau) level? 
COPIES AND ROUTING: 
SEND TO S/S MESSAGE CENTER 
Staff Study: Original and two carbon copies 
Letters and Memoranda for signature of Secretary or Under Secretary: 
Original Complimentary Blue Two carbons marked for S/S 
One carbon marked for RM/R-C ~One carbo'n marked for return to officer 
A-dditional carbons rnarked 'for re'tur~ to all a):lpropri;ate bursaus for information. 
REFER TO YOUR BUREAU'S COPY OF THE S/S-RO INSTRUCTIONS AND TO YOUR CORRESPONDENCE HANDBOOK 
JOINT MIDDLE EAST 
PLANNING COMMITTEE 
AN AGENCY OF, AND DIRECTLY RE- ....... 
SPONSIBLE TO THE JCS FOR PRE- ~ 
PARING AND COORDINATING STRAT-
·EGIC PLANS FOR THE DEFENSE OF 
NORTH AFRICA (EXCLUSIVE OF THE 
AREA ASSIGNED USCINCEUR) AND 
THE MIDDLE EAST 
JOINT MUNITIONS 
ALLOCA'FION COMMITTEE 
CHARGED WITH PERFORMING FOR THE 
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF DUTIES 
RELATING TO THE ALLOCATION OF 
FINISHED MUNITIONS 
U.S. DEL. INTER-AMERICAN 
DEFENSE BOARD 
STUDIES AND RECO!jMENDS TO THE ""---.. GOVERNMENTS OF THE AMERICAN RE· ~ 
PUBLICS MEASURES NECESSARY FOR 
CLOSER MILITARY COLLABORATION IN 
PREPARATION FOR THE COLLECTIVE 
SELF - DEFENSE OF THE AMERICAN 
CONTINENT AGAINST AGGRESSION. 
U.S. MIL. REPRESENTATION, 
PERMANENT JOINT BO~RD 
ON DEFENSE, CAN. -U.S. 
MAKES STUDIES RELATING TO SEA, 
LAND, AND AIR PROBLEMS, INCLUD-
ING PERSONNEL AND MATERIEL, AND 
TO CONSIDER, IN THE BROAD SENSE, 
THE DEFENSE OF THE NORTHERN HALF 
OF THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE. 
U.S. SECT., JOINT MEXICAN-
U.S. DEFENSE COMMISSION 
STUDIES PROBLEMS RELATING TO 
THE COMMON DEFENSE OF THE U.S. 
AND MEXICO, CONSIDERING BROAD 
PLANS FOR THE DEFENSE OF MEXICO 
AND ADJACENT AREAS OF THE u.s., 
AND PROPOSING TO THE RESPECTIVE 
GOVERNMENTS THE COOPERATIVE 
MEASURES WHICH, IN ITS OPINION, 
WOULD BE ADOPTED. 
. 
1 U.S. DELEGATION, U:N. 
MIL. STAFF COM._.; 
KEEPS THE JOINT CHIEFS . OF STAFF 
ADVISED OF STRATEGIC PLANS AND 
POLITICAL MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS 
OF THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE, 
PROMOTES AND SUPPORTS POLICIES 
AND PLANS OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF 
STAFF IN COMMITTEE ACTIONS, AND 
FULFILLS THE COMMITMENTS OF THE 
UNITED STATES AS DEFINED IN THE 
UNITED NATIONS CHARTER. 
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 
CHAIRMAN'S 
STAFF GROUP 
JOINT CHIEFS OF ~ 
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF CONSIST OF THE CHAIRMAN[ 
THE CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY; THE CHIEF OF NAVAL 0
1 OF STAFF, U.S. AIR FORCE. THE COMMANDANT OF THEM 
STATUS WITH REGARD TO MATTERS ON WHICH HE HAS EXP 
OF THE MARINE CORPS. (P.L. 416, 82D CONGRESS). FUN 
UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 216, 81ST CONGA 
1949 AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DIRECTIVE NO, 5 
I SERVES AS PRESIDIN:~F~~ !~~I~~ .. 
CHARGED WITH PROCURING AND PRE- PROVIDES AGENDA FOR MEETINGS OF THE JOINT 
PARING DATA, AND PROVIDING AD- lAND ASSISTS THEM IN PROSECUTING BUSINESS I 
VANCE RESEARCH OF INFORMATION ~ ........ !PATES FULLY IN THE ACTIVITIES OF THE JOINT 
FOR USE OF THE CHAIRMAN, JCS.III lFURNISHES TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE PR( 
ITEMS OF CURRENT INTEREST MAKES ARRANGEMI 
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF OF MATTERS OF Ll 




RESPONSIBLE FOR REVIEWING, WHEN 
NECESSARY, JCS PAPERS CONTAINING 
LOGISTIC IMPLICATIONS AND SUB-
MITTING RECOMMENDATIONS THEREON 
TO THE JCS • 







JOINT STAFF AS PRINCIPAL AGENT OF THE CHAI 
i 
MAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, ~ 
!DIRECTOR OF THE JOINT STAFF 
THE RESPONSIBILITY AND AUTHOR ( 
FOR SUPERVISING, COORDINATIN 
AND ADMINISTERING THE WORK 
THE ENTIRE ORGANIZATION WHIO 
SUPPORTS THE JOINT CHIEFS 
STAFF,EXCEPT FOR THE JOINT ST 
TEGIC SURVEY COMMITTEE, THE U 
MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE, ~ 
THE U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO ~ 
MILITARY COMMITTEE, MILITARY, 
REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE, ~ 








I I JOINT CONMUNICATI 
ELECTRONICS CONN 
CHARGED WITH THE PREPARATION OF 
JOINT STUDIES AND PLANS ON CUR-
RENT AND FUTURE STRATEGY AND 
RELATED MILITARY POLICY, THE CO· 
ORDINATION OF STRATEGIC PLANS OF 
THE ARMED FORCES AND WITH THE 
FORMULATION OF POLICIES FOR 
JOINT TRAINING AND EDUCATION. 
CHARGED WITH THE PREPARATION OF 
R£COMMENOATIONS TO THE JOINT 
CHIEFS OF STAFF ON SUCH LO-
GISTIC MATTERS AND MAJOR MA-
TERIAL REQUIREMENTS AND PERSON; 
NEL QUALIFICATIONS AND REQUIRE· 
MENTS AS ARE THE RESPONSIBILITY 
OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 
• 
CHARGED WITH THE PREPARATION OF 
RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE JOINT 
CHIEFS OF STAFF ON MATTERS RELA-
TING TO TRANSPORTATION, AND WITH 
THE COORDINATION AND CONTROL OF 
POLICIES,DOCTRINE,AND PROCEDURES 
FOR ALL TYPES OF TRANSPORTATION 
TO THE EXTENT THAT SUCH FUNCTION~ 





CHARGED WITH COGNIZANCE · o~ 
NICATIONS•ELECTRONICS INS 
THEY PERTAIN TO MAllER 














RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PREPARATION 
OF JOINT PLANS AND STUDIES ON 
CURRENT AND FUTURE STRATEGY AND 
MILITARY POLICY AS DIRECTED BY 
THE DIRECTOR OF THE JOINT STAFF 




RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PREPARATION 
OF JOINT LOGISTICS, JOINT TRANS-
PORTATION AND PERSONNEL PLANS 
AND STUDIES AS D I RECTEO BY THE 
DIRECTOR OF THE JOINT S T.AFF AND 
BY THE JOINT LOGISTICS PLANS 
COMMITTEE OR THE JOINT MILITARY 
TRANSPORTATION COMMITTEE. 
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO JCS 
FOR NSC AFFAIRS 
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ADVISOR 
ON THE PLANNING BOARD OF THE 
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 
HISTORICAL 
SECTION 
AGENCY OF THE JCS FOR THE ACCOM• 
PLISHMENT OF ALL TASKS OF 




RESPONSIBLE FOR JOINT PLA 
STUDIES FOR THE DIRECT 
COORDINATION BY THE JCS 
OPERATIONAL ASPECTS OF 
COMMUNICATIONS • ELECTRO~ 
TIVITIES OF THE SERVIO 
WITH THE PERFORMANCE OF S 
HER TASKS AS THE DIRECTO~ 
STAFF AND THE JOINT CO~ 




STUDIES THE MILITARY ASP 
NATIONAL SECURITY IN Ll 
ADVANCEMENTS OF ATOMIC 
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY,C 
I~G THE EFFECT OF SUCH 
UPON MILITARY ART, AND 
THEREON, PREPARES STUD 
RECOMMENDATIONS ON MILl 
TEAS FOR USE BY PLANNING 
OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF S 
THE SERVICES. IT FUNCTt g 
THE DIRECTOR, JOINT ~ 
-
: STAFF ORGANIZATION 
CHIEFS OF STAFF 
CONSIST OF THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS UF STAFF; 
AMY; THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS; AND THE CHIEF 
, THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS HAS COEQUAL 
TEAS ON WHICH HE HAS EXPRESSED THE DIRECT CONCERN 
•• 416, 82D CONGRESS). FUNCTIONS ARE AS AUTHORIZED 
aBLIC LAW 216, 81ST CONGRESS, APPROVED 10 AUGUST 
DEFENSE DIRECTIVE NO, 5100.1 OF 16 MARCH 1954, 
---, --CHAIRMAN 
G OFFICER OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, 
OR MEETINGS OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 
IN PROSECUTING BUSINESS PROMPTLY. PARTIC- I 
E ACTIVITIES OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, 
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE PROGRESS REPORTS ON 
INTEREST MAKES ARRANGEMENTS TO RELIEVE 
OF STAFF OF MATTERS OF LESSER IMPORTANCE, 
AGES THE JOINT STAFF AND THE SUBORDINATE 
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF . I 
- , 
COMMITTEE FOR JOINT 
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 
CONSISTS OF THE OPERATIONS 
DEPUTIES ON A PART-TIME BASIS, 
RESPONSIBLE FOR PRELIMINARY 
~ONSIDERATIONS OF PAPERS ON 
JOINT PULICIES, DOCTRINES, & 
PROCEDURES; AND FOR RECOMMEND- · 
lNG ACTION THEREON TO THE 




RINCIPAL AGENT OF THE CHAIR- I 
U.S. REP. TO THE MIL. 
CON., Ml L. REP. CON., 
l STAND. GROUP OF NATO 
JOt NT STRATEGIC 
SURVEY COMMITTEE 
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, THE 
:CTOR OF THE JOINT STAFF HAS· 
RESPONSIBILITY AND AUTHORITY 
SUPERVISING, COORDINATING, 
ADMINISTERING THE WORK OF 
ENTIRE ORGANIZATION WHICH 
OATS THE JOINT CHIEFS OF 
F,EXCEPT FOR THE JOINT STRA-
C SURVEY COMMITTEE, THE U,N, 
TARY STAFF COMMITTEE, AND 
U,S, REPRESENTATIVE TO THE 
TARY COMMITTEE, MILITARY 
ESENTATIVES COMMITTEE, AND 





CHARGED WITH COGNIZANCE"OF CO~ 
NICATIONS-E~~TRONICS INSOFAR AS 
THEY ~ TO MATTERS FOR 
WHICH THE JCS ARE RESPONSIBLE, 
REPRESENTS AND IS DIRECTLY 
RESPONSIBLE TO THE JOINT CHIEFS 
OF STAFF FOR NATO MILITARY MAT-
TERS UNDER CONSIDERATION BY THE 
STANDING GROUP, MILITARY REPRE-
SENTATIVES COMMITTEE, OR THE 
MILITARY COMMITTEE, 
JOINT MIL ASSISTANCE 
AFFAIRS COMMITTEE 
CHARGED WITH THE PREPARATION OF 
JOINT STUDIES AND POLICIES ON 





RESPONSIBLE FOR JOINT PLANS AND 
STUDIES FOR THE DIRECTION AND 
COORDINATION BY THE JCS OF THE 
OPERATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE 
COMMUNICATIONS - ELECTRONICS AC-
TIVITIES OF THE SERVICES AND 
WITH THE PERFORMANCE OF SUCH OT-
HER TASKS AS THE DIRECTOR, JOINT 
STAFF AND THE JOINT COMMUNICA-




STUDIES THE MILITARY ASPECTS OF 
NATIONAL SECURITY IN LIGHT OF 
ADVANCEMENTS OF ATOMIC AGE IN 
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY,CONSIDER-
ING THE EFFECT OF SUCH CONCEPTS 
UPON MILITARY ART, AND, BASED 
THEREON, PREPARES STUDIES AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS ON MILITARY MAT-
TERS FOR USE BY PLANNING AGENC)~ 
OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AND 
THE SERVICES. IT FUNCTIONS UNDER 
THE DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF 
JOINT MIL. ASSISTANCE 
AFFAIRS GROUP 
RESPUNSIBLE FOR PREPARATION OF 
JOINT POLICIES, STUDIES AND RE-
PORTS ON Ml Ll TARY ASS I STANCE· 
AFFAIRS AS DIRECTED BY THE DI-
RECTOR OF THE JOINT STAFF OR BY 
THE JOINT MILITARY ASSISTANCE 
AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, 
ADVISES THE JOINT CHIEFS OF 




CHARGED WITH PREPARATION AND RE-
VIEW OF CERTAIN CLASSIFIED JOINT 
STRATEGIC PLANS AND STUDIES IN 
SUPPORT OF CURRENT AND FUTURE 




RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PREPARATION 
OF CERTAIN CLASSIFIED JOINT 
STRATEGIC PLANS AS DIRECTED BY 
THE DIRECTOR OF THE JOINT STAFF 
OR BY THE JOINT SUBSIDIARY 
ACTIVITIES COMMITTEE, ALSO RE-
SPONSIBLE FOR LIAISON IN CERTAIN 
CLASSIFIED MATTERS BErNEEN THE 
ORGANIZATION OF THE JOINT CHIEFS 
OF STAFF AND OTHER GOVERNMENTAL 
DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCI~S. 
JOt NT INTELLIGENCE 
COMMITTEE 
CnARGED WITH THE FORMULATION OF 
JOINT INTELLIGENCE AND THE PER-
FORMANCE OF SUCH TASKS AND 
FUNCTIONS AS MAY BE ASSIGNED BY 
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, 
JOINT INTELLIGENCE 
GROUP 
RESPUNSIBLE FOR STAFF SUPPORT ON 
INTELLIGENCE MATTERS TO THEJOINT 
INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE, THE OTH-
ER AGENCIES OF THE JCS AND TO 
THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF 
DEFENSE; PERFORMS OTHER TASKS 
AS THE DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF, OR 












CHARGED WITH THE PERFORM~CE OF 
SECRETARIAL AND SUCH OTHER DU-
TIES AS MAY BE PRESCRIBED BY ·--~~~~~THE DIRECTOR OF THE JOINT STAFF, 
PERFORMS ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES 
FOR THE JCS ORGANIZATION. ESTAB-
LISHES PROCEDURES FOR PROCESSING 




1~--· RESPONSIBLE TO THE JOI)lT CHIEFS OF STAFF FOR COORDINATING BASIC METHODS AND PROC[DURES, OPERA-
TIONS, ALLOCATION OF EQUIPMENT 
TO MEET OPERATIONAL NEEDS, AND 
ALL OTHER MrTEOROLOGICAL MAT-
TERS OF JOINT APPLICATION EX-
CEPT RESEARCA AND DEVELOPMENT 
U.S. SECT. Ml LITARY-
COOPERATION CONMITIEE 
PREPARES AND REVISES RECOMMEN-
DATIONS FOR IMPLEMENT~TION OF 
THE BASIC SECURI~Y PLAN FOR THE 
NORTH AMERIGAN CONTINENT 
U.S. DEL., JOINT BRAZIL -U.S. 
DEFENSE COMMISSION 
RESPONSIBLE TO THE JOINT CHIEFS 
OF STAFF FOR ASSISTING THE JOINT 
BRAZIL•U,S, MILITARY COMMISSION 
IN ~PECIFIC MATTERS OF TRAINING, 
STUDIES, LIAISON AND PROCUREMENt 
U.S. DEL, JOINT BRAZIL· 
U.S. MILITARY COMMISSION 
MAKES RECO~NDATIONS ON MATTERS 
•....... AFFECTING MUTUAL DEFENSE AND OTHER MATTERS OF MILITARY COL-
LABORATION BETWEEN THE TWO COUN· 
TRY AND ADVISING AND ASSISTING 
BRAZILIAN ARMED FORCES TO ADOPT 
U.S, EQUI~NT, ORGANIZATION, 
TRAINING, TACTI~L,AND ADMINIS-













IIAJ L .0. HOLDER, USA 56291 
ASST. ADMIN. SECRETARY 







MISS S, HARRISON 7'1'0 
MRS, O,C, FARRALL 7,1,0 
MR. R.B, JONES 
M/SGT T.F. CAHILL, USA 
PRESENTATION SECTION SECURITY SECTION 
- WO W.R. IRWIN, USN 5,704 
M/SGT, A.C. SMITH,JR,USAF 74600 
MR. J, SCOTT ~6291 
-M/SGT. L. KOWALSKI, USA 6292 
PHOTOSTAT SECTION 
SERVICES l SUPPLY SECT. MR. O,W. STEVENS 526,1 SFC. G.F. PIERCE, USA 526,1 
-
MR, R,E. MORTON 56,07 
MR, H. T HOLMES 72249 
CIVILIAN AND/OR ENLISTED 
PERSONNEL SUPPORT ONLY 
OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN 
... MR. P.M. KEARNEY 
Ill. R.R. DAY 
55066 
53558 
DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF 
-
MRS. R. LAWSON, SECY 71297 
HISTORICAL 
.... 
MRS. P,S. BUTLER 55456 
U.S. DEL UN M ll. STAFF COM. 
.... 
COL, R L. INMAN, USA NY 
MR. A. CIVITELLA NY 
SPECIAL ASST. TO JCS 
... FOR NSC AFFAIRS 
MISS M.K. CONLEY, SECY, 56705 
SECRETARY 
BRIG, GEN. R.D. WENTWORTH, USAF 
MISS M. FREEMAN, SECY 
DEPUTY SECRETA 
COL. H.L. HILLYARD, USA 
MRS W. MC DONALD, SECY. 
EXECUTIVE SECRETA~ 
CAPT F.H. CARDE, USN 
MISS 0, HARRIS, SECY 
ASSI EXECUTIVE SECRET 
LT.COL. H.A, MCKEE, USAF 5 
COMMITTEE, AGENCY, B 
AND GROUP SECRETA 
JOINT STRATEGIC JC 
• PLANS COMMITTEE PLj 
LT.COL. R.L. HINCHEE, USAF 56147 LT.COL W 
CDR K.B. BROWN, USN 56702 MAJ. E.C 
JOINT INTELUGENCE COMM. JOIN 
.... LCOL. S. M. PATTEN, USA 52239 
MAJ. D.E. STURDEVANT, USAF 56u60 
LT .COL ~ 
MAJ. E., 
LT. H.D. TRAIN, II, USN 7uS78 
CAPT. R. CIPOLLA, USA 7A450 
CWO E. C. SMITH, .USA 56338 
JOINT CONN. ELEC. COM. 
.... COL. J. BUSH, USAF 56727 
CAPT J.H CURRAN, USN 71176 








MAJ. T,E. ROGERS, USA 78982 
JOINT MILITARY ASSIST. 
-
AFFAIRS COMMITTEE 















SECRETARY JOI T CHIEFS OF STAFF GEN. R.O. WENTWORTH, USAF 72700 ~. FREEMAN, SECY 7207~ 
:PUTY SECRETARY 
H.L. HILLYARD, USA 72960 
W MC DON ALO, SECY 78922 
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY AJCC COORDINATOR 
PT F.H. CAROE, USN 
SS 0. HARRIS, SECY 
55234 
71959 
CAPT J.L. BEEKMAN, USAF 56291 
SI EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 
.COL. H.A. MC KEE, USAF 55234 
~ M ITTEE, AGENCY, BOARD 

















PLANS COMMITTEE ._ 
LT.COL W.A. MC KANEY,JR,USA551~7 
MAJ. E.C. QUIGLEY USAF 55147 
JOINT MIL. TRANS. CONN. 
LT.COL W.A. MC KANEY,JR,USA55147 ... 
MAJ. E.C. QUIGLEY, USAF 55147 
JT. STRAI SURVEY COM 
COL K.R KENERICK, USA 73800 • 
COR. A.W. CO X, USN 71876 
LT.COL. H.M. THOMPSON,USAF 73007 
JT. MID. EAST PLAN. COM* 
LCDR J. SPARGER, USN 54846 .. 
LCOL. J.F DAVIS JR , USA 54846 
* PROVIDED BY MILITARY SERVICES 
JOINT ADVANCED 
STUDY COMMITTEE ._ 
CDR. J.J MITCHELL, USN 52954 
~--------------~ 
MIL COOPERATION COM. 
MAJ. M.J. SPAUR, USAF 
MISS H.C. STEVENIS 
74851 • 
74B51 
U.S. DEL INTER-AMERICAN 
DEFENSE BOARD • 
LT.COL. W.S. COLEMAN, USA 763~8 
MAJ. W.P. RENNY, USAF 76338 
LcotDJ ~ .lBJR~fr~· u~~CTI 07~557 
LCOL. E.C. BURTENSHAW,USAF 55513. 
LCDR H.W. HILLER, USN 55513 
MAJ B. MAGRUDER JR., USMC 55513 
MR. H. B·. DOWNING 54550 
COORD.& EVAL. SECTION 
MR. M.R. DAY 
MR. L.H. HOWARD 
Ml N.l RPTS. SECTION 
MR. D.C. FLICKINGER 






LCOL. J.B. SHUPE, USA 79660 
------·"---~ - - - ~ 
JCS SUB-REGISTRY SECT. 
... CWO J.T. CHAPIN, USN 72694 
M/SGT J.T GANNON, USAF 72694 
MESSAGE CENTER SECTION 
~~~ CAPT K.F BENKESSER, USAF 53337 
CAPT J.M. FARRELL, USA 53337 
J CS DUTY OFFICER 
DUTY OFFICER 53337 
JOINT SECRETARIAT LOCATOR CHART 
PREPARED BY 
RESEARCH l RECORDS 
ANALYSIS SECT • 
MR. J.J. BERGMANN 79127 
MRS. E.W. ALLEN 79127 
JCS REPOSITOR(SECTION 
CAPT. J .L. BEEKMAN, .USAF 
M/SGT F.J. STRACK, ~SAF 
56291 • 
56291 
JOI~T CHIEFS OF STAFF PRESENTATION SECTION 
1 FEBRUARY 1958 
